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Abstract 
The study is motivated by the question “what is the optimal tariff design?” While we do not offer an 
answer to this question, we use the different designs in four select countries to illuminate the issues 
involved in designing electricity network tariffs.  Electricity networks are a resource shared by all network 
users.  A tariff design that is clear to network users and well understood by them can help them make 
efficient decisions.  A design that sets up conflicting or perverse incentives results in economic 
distortions.  We find that there are a variety of choices and trade-offs while designing the electricity 
network tariffs for any electricity system.  The tariff design must not only be influenced by the technical 
and economic characteristics of the system, but also the secondary policy objectives that policy makers 
wish to achieve, while allowing network companies to recover the costs of building and maintaining the 
network. 
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PART I : THEORETICAL OVERVIEW  
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The study is motivated by the question “what is the optimal tariff design?” While we do not offer an 
answer to this question, we use the different designs in four select countries to illuminate the issues 
involved in designing electricity network tariffs.  Transmission and distribution networks are characterized 
by a number of important technical and economic features that shape the regulatory institutions used to 
manage the networks.  In turn, the chosen regulatory institutions influence the design of electricity 
network tariffs.  
Electricity networks are a resource shared by all network users.  Decisions must be made about what 
costs are to be incurred and how those costs are to be shared across different users.  These are 
complicated decisions. Network tariffs can be organized to include charges for bundles of services or to 
include separate charges for distinct services.  These charges can be conditioned on various measures of 
the customer’s use of the network, or the costs that the customer imposes on the network. The tariff 
design shapes incentives for the use and expansion of the system, which further influences costs.  A tariff 
design that is clear to network users and well understood by them can help them make efficient decisions.  
A design that sets up conflicting or perverse incentives results in economic distortions.    
A main constraint on the tariff design is the overall budget constraint: the total of all charges to all users 
must be sufficient to cover the costs of the network and afford the network company an adequate return 
on its capital.  On the other hand, the total of all charges should be kept reasonable, in the sense that the 
network company is not extracting monopoly profits. 
Transmission networks are different from distribution networks in terms of their technical requirements 
and usage patterns.  Tariffs may therefore be designed differently for the two types of networks to provide 
specific incentives to the respective users.  We discuss tariff designs for both types of networks.     
To set the stage for the description of alternative tariff designs, it is beneficial to revisit the issues arising 
out of the economic characteristics of electricity networks and the consequent regulatory provisions.  
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1. NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS 
1.1 Natural Monopolies 
Electricity networks - both transmission and distribution - are treated as natural monopolies because of 
the existence of economies of scale and scope in the delivery of electricity.  Economies of scale exist 
when a firm’s average cost of production declines as output increases.  Economies of scope exist when it 
is cheaper to produce combinations of different products within a single multi-product firm, than to have 
specialty firms produce the different products (Panzar and Willig 1981).  
Electricity networks achieve economies of scale when their capacity is sized to meet the demand for all 
network users within their network territory.  For a given network capacity, the average cost of production 
decreases as the capacity utilization increases, and is lowest when utilization is maximized.  The average 
cost of production is lowest if the network company sells to the entire market, that is, when it meets the 
total demand.  Competition in electricity networks for a particular service territory, especially in distribution 
networks, is economically inefficient because small competing firms would be required to make large 
redundant investments to reach a relatively small number of customers in that territory (Kahn 1988).   
Electricity delivery is multi-product because delivering electricity at peak and off-peak hours to customers 
or to customers located in different regions can be considered as supplying different products.  However, 
a network company needs to have only one network in place to supply all the products.  The company 
can therefore realize economies of scope, even if minimal economies of scale are associated with one of 
its many products, such as delivering electricity at non-peak times of the day.  Monopoly is thus natural 
because one network firm can serve a range of products to any number of customers in a given territory 
at lower cost than two or more firms (Joskow and Schmalensee 1983). 
A monopolistic electricity delivery company could charge prices that are much higher than the cost of 
delivery.  Network company revenues from electricity sales are therefore regulated to ensure that they do 
not significantly exceed the cost of delivery.  The network company is also mandated to serve all 
customers, both generators and consumers, according to standards and rules established by the 
regulatory authorities.  Regulated revenues must be sufficient to allow the recovery of operating and 
capital costs, including a reasonable rate of return on investments, to ensure the financial viability of the 
company in the short-run (Rothwell and Gomez 2003).  Regulated revenues are therefore also termed as 
required revenues, to indicate the sufficiency criteria of the total revenues of the network company. 
The choice of natural monopoly regulation as the framework for network governance implies that the 
regulator must participate in certain key decisions affecting the network.  In doing so, the regulator acts 
on behalf of electricity customers, and its choices will influence the costs that various network users will 
ultimately incur.  The decision of what investments the network company is allowed to make is an 
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illustration of regulatory participation.  The large capital costs of equipment such as lines, transformers, 
sub-stations, communication and protection devices, control mechanisms, etc is much higher than the 
recurring operating costs of the network.  The expected useful life of assets is also quite long, usually at 
least 30 to 40 years.  Network assets are also dedicated, i.e. they cannot be easily moved or re-deployed 
for other purposes.  Thus, the natural monopoly network owner will invest in setting up and maintaining 
the network only if it is assured of cost recovery.  By approving investments through the revenue 
requirement, the regulator establishes the prudency of investments and an assurance of cost recovery for 
the network company. 
A regulated natural monopoly must also be given incentives to operate efficiently.  This is especially 
important in restructured markets where network companies are legally separate from generation 
companies, because the actions of network companies have an impact on generation and network usage 
in the system.  Coordination across the different types of entities must be achieved through appropriate 
incentives.  This topic is discussed in the following sections. 
     
1.2 A Shared Resource 
Electricity networks are a shared resource and a public good. Many decisions about the design of the 
network determine the volume and quality of service that all users will enjoy, and must be made on behalf 
of all. Quite often, the cost of providing service to one user depends on the services being provided to 
other users, and also upon how other users are using the system. 
The shared nature of the network complicates the answers to the questions of what network to build, 
which connections to enable, and what quality of service to provide.  There are joint decisions to be made 
on the quality of service to be provided and on the network structure, which imposes different costs on 
various users.  There are individual decisions of the users who will interact with the network, and in doing 
so, impose costs on the system as a whole and on other users.  Because of the long life of network 
assets and their immovability, many of the decisions will impact future customers, and the regulator must 
be able to take decisions now on their behalf.  The flip side of this issue is the question of how to share 
the burden of paying for the network? Can users be charged according to the benefits they receive from 
the system or according to the costs they impose on it? What principles define the allocation of cost and 
benefits to various network users?  A few examples are discussed here that illustrate the nature of 
electricity networks as a shared resource and the difficulty in clearly assigning costs and benefits. 
Some industrial end-use customers such as manufacturers value high power quality much more than the 
average customer.  The network company may have to invest in dedicated assets or modify its operations 
solely for the purpose of providing higher power quality to such customers.  Where they are isolated or at 
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a distance from the main network, the costs of dedicated assets could be allocated to the individual 
customer.  In areas where such industrial customers are in the same part of the network as other average 
commercial or residential customers, these other end-users may also benefit from the installation of 
dedicated assets.  Should these users be responsible for higher charges for a service they do not need? 
All network users indirectly benefit from reliability-related network reinforcements, but it is hard to 
determine how much each user should be charged for such costs.  For instance, the addition of a 
transmission line to relieve congestion or transmission constraints in one region of an existing network 
might alter the power flows and decrease the costs of delivering service not only in that region but also in 
other parts of the network.  In this scenario, should the costs be allocated only to users in the previously 
congested area?  Should users in previously uncongested parts who did not experience problems with 
network service and did not need the new transmission line also be charged?  If yes, then on what basis 
and how much?  In both cases, some users might be subsidizing the cost of reliable electricity service to 
others.  Thus, clearly assigning benefits and costs in situations where the benefits are distributed to a 
large part of the network is difficult. 
When some network users such as distributed generators impose high reinforcement and operating costs 
on the distribution system, the charges for other end-use customers in the distribution company’s service 
territory might increase.  If the distributed generator is charged for all of the connection and reinforcement 
costs, it will subsidize some of the reliability benefits to other customers, as discussed in the transmission 
case above.  If the generator is not charged for all of those reinforcements, then other customers could be 
overpaying for some of the benefits.  Thus, connecting some types of network users may bring benefits 
but also impose costs on other users.  How is a system to explicitly allocate these?            
Network investments selected today must anticipate the uncertain long-term future needs of the system. 
This is because the availability of equipment in only a limited number of standardized capacity ratings 
makes it difficult to size new capacity additions to exactly match expected utilization or to add capacity 
incrementally, especially at the transmission level.  As discussed above, economies of scale may also be 
realized if the network company meets all of the future demand for network use.  New network 
investments are therefore sized to meet forecasted long-term capacity requirements and occur 
infrequently and in large blocks.  However, if the realized network use differs significantly from the 
forecasts, then some assets may become “stranded.”  The trade-off is between minimizing network costs 
today and undertaking larger investments motivated by economies of scale over the life of the asset.  
Consequently, how will network users decide to pay for the cost of assets allocated to them today that 
may not be as valuable in the uncertain future?           
Network losses on transmission and distribution systems are not a simple function of the power bought 
and sold at any two points on the network between individual generators and consumers.  The losses 
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depend on the structure of all the inputs and withdrawals of power in the network.  How then are the costs 
of losses to be allocated to network users? 
The cost of providing service to one user is thus rarely independent of the services being provided to 
other users and the usage of the network as a whole.  However, in many of the examples discussed, 
differentiating between every customer may not be essential.  For instance, residential customers who 
might make up the large majority of customers enjoy an almost identical level of quality of service.  
Establishing a minimum quality of service will therefore benefit all these customers, and the costs can be 
recovered from all.  Industrial end-users who prefer higher quality of service can choose to pay for 
dedicated network assets located close to their facilities without imposing costs on other customers.  
Such differentiation might therefore create opportunities for flexibility in tariff design. 
   
1.3 A Basis for Incentives 
Network cost allocation is thus a complex task, due to the shared nature of networks.  It is also 
incomplete without an adequate consideration of the incentives that have been created for the network 
company and various network users.  Incentives are important in restructured markets because the 
benefits of competition are realized when actions of various entities in the electricity system are well 
coordinated.  In vertically integrated systems, the regulator could force coordination between one or a few 
entities, since decisions of investments and operations of generation and networks were largely made 
within the vertically integrated firm.  In restructured systems, generation firms are independent of 
networks and operate in a market framework.  Many systems have also separated distribution from retail 
supply of electricity to end-use customers.  The larger number of agents and the diversity of regulatory 
frameworks necessitate a hard look at the incentives faced by various entities.  Understanding the shared 
nature of networks is therefore a pre-requisite for the creation of appropriate incentives.       
A few of the ways in which the cost of providing service to one user is shaped by overall system use, both 
in the short-run and the long-run, are described here. 
 
1.3.1 Short-run Influences 
When a new generator connects to the system, there are some straightforward costs of wiring and 
equipment directly related to the connection between the generator and its point of connection with the 
network system.  However, the new generator connection at that location may significantly affect the 
power flows over the entire network.  This change in flow patterns may require upgrades and 
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reinforcements elsewhere in the network.  The term “shallow costs” is used to differentiate between the 
set of direct connection costs, excluding the cost of system-wide reinforcements, from the set of “deep 
costs” which includes the cost of necessary reinforcements.  An important choice to be made in such 
cases is whether the connecting generator should be charged for the shallow costs of the network 
connection, or the more inclusive deep costs.  This example also applies to new consumer connections, 
or new interconnections with adjacent networks. 
   
1.3.2 Long-run Influences 
Investments in generation and transmission may be coordinated in order to minimize the size of 
investments required in each.   To some degree, expanded levels of generation require expanded 
transmission capacity.  But generation and transmission can also substitute for one another.  A properly 
placed transmission line can alleviate congestion and reduce the need for new generation in other parts 
of the network.  It may also change the distribution of load and power flows across the network and lower 
the overall level of losses in the system.  The careful placement and capacity of transmission lines 
influences network reliability and may enable load to be served at the same quality of service without 
requiring additional generators or ancillary services.   
In some aspects, the cost responsibility is easier to assign.  For instance, network users can be held 
responsible for the direct costs of connecting to the network, which enables them to accrue the benefits of 
the network.  But it is much more difficult to assess a single new user’s contribution to the network 
reinforcements required at higher voltage levels when the user connects at a lower voltage level.  
Furthermore, all existing users connected at that level benefit from reinforcements at higher levels. In this 
case, the electricity system could choose whether to assign responsibility to only the new user or all 
existing users for the cost of reinforcements. 
Standards for reliability and quality of service are largely based on the preferences of consumers in an 
electricity system. If a certain level of reliability or quality of service for electricity delivery is standardized 
or mandated, all network users benefit from it.  However, such standards influence the costs incurred in 
operation and maintenance of networks.  But calculating the marginal cost of reliability or quality of 
service for a single new user is not feasible, because other users also benefit from increased reliability 
and quality standards.  The marginal costs and benefits for particular users could be approximated using 
an instrument such as a reference network model, which simulates the conditions of the real network 
under a variety of scenarios and attempts to estimate the value of the network to various users.  
However, such a model becomes difficult to implement as the complexity of the network and number of 
users increases.  The difficulty of assigning cost responsibility to users in the form of marginal costs and 
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benefits necessitates that electricity systems must choose other methods that will allow for the eventual 
recovery of network costs. 
Addressing cost allocation in the context of shared natural monopoly networks and the need to create 
appropriate incentives for various users are thus the underlying issues that influence the mechanisms for 
network tariff design. 
 
2. TARIFFS 
The central choice of any tariff design is deciding how to differentiate between various types of network 
usage for the dual purpose of allocating network costs and creating appropriate incentives.  The important 
objective is to establish a process for determining who pays for what services and how much.  Electricity 
systems have a significant degree of flexibility with regard to how tariffs are designed, bearing in mind the 
cost categories discussed above and the shared nature of networks.  Systems could distinguish between 
generators and end-use customers for the purposes of cost allocation; for example, generators may not 
be required to pay network tariffs.  Systems could also vary charges by connection capacity (MW), such 
that large consumers with a higher demand for electricity pay more.  Alternatively, distinguishing between 
customers by the amount of consumption (MWh) will require those consuming higher volumes of 
electricity to pay more.  The incentives established will be a consequence of the design selected.  The 
following discussion illustrates some of the available design choices. 
 
2.1 Tariff Architecture 
Within the class of network tariffs, a number of typical architectural elements for different services are 
prevalent such as (i) connection services, (ii) use of the network system, (iii) commercial services, etc.  
For each of these elements, the question of what methodology or formula to use must be addressed.  The 
typical design choices for each element are summarized in Table 1. 
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Table 1.  Choices and Variations for Architectural Elements 
- minimum fee
- maximum fee
- average
- transaction fees
to recover the cost of services 
such as billing, customer 
support, etc
Commercial 
Services 
Charge
- average fee
- lump sums
- reference network model
- postage stamp
- megawatt mile
- contract path
- decoupling
- gross- or net-metering
- shallow 
- deep 
- average
Design Choices
may be differentiated by
- capacity demand (MW)
- consumption (MWh)
- time of day
- season
- average per connection
to recover the recurring operating 
and capital costs for network 
maintenance and expansion
Use-of-System 
Charge
- increasing over time
- decreasing over time
to recover the cost of policy 
outcomes such as nuclear 
moratoria or decommissioning,  
cross-subsidization of low 
income or rural communities, 
stranded costs of restructuring, 
feed-in tariffs for renewables, etc
Energy 
Policy 
Charge
may be levied 
- up front
- in limited installments
- periodically
to recover the initial, non-
recurring connection costs for 
enabling the user to receive 
network services
Connection 
Charge
VariationsPurposeElement
 
 
2.1.1 Connection Charges 
Network users can be required to pay an initial, non-recurring connection charge to cover the cost of 
connecting to the network in order to receive network services. Generators usually pay to connect to the 
transmission network. Consumers usually pay to connect to the distribution network at low voltage levels, 
and in some cases at higher voltage levels. A new network connection may have a physical or technical 
impact on the rest of the network in terms of reliability or quality of service, especially when the 
connections are large as in the case on generators. A system impact study is usually conducted to 
evaluate the type and extent of network reinforcements that may be required at different network levels to 
ensure reliability and quality of service. Electricity system regulations must have a provision for the 
recovery of costs associated with reinforcements.  In cases where network users are responsible only for 
shallow network charges, the cost of reinforcements must be recovered from all other network users. 
Systems could require new connectors to pay for a small or large fraction of the reinforcement costs. 
Alternatively, new users could be charged the average of the total connection cost due to all new users 
connecting during a given time period. 
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2.1.2  Use of System (UoS)  Charges 
Network users can be required to pay UoS charges as part of the network tariff to recover the recurring 
operating and capital expenses incurred in network operation and investment.  The primary network-
related costs for network owners and operators, both transmission and distribution, can be categorized as 
follows: 
Capital or Fixed Costs 
• Network infrastructure including wires, substations, transformers, etc 
• New connections to generators, customers, or adjacent networks 
• Reinforcement of existing infrastructure by adding wires, transformers, etc 
• Debt financing costs, required returns on capital 
Operating Costs 
• Maintenance of network infrastructure 
• Scheduling and dispatch services 
• Network related ancillary services such as voltage control, etc 
• Network company’s administrative expenses 
• Taxes 
The required revenues must cover the operating and capital expenses of networks in the short- and long-
run such as maintenance of networks, providing access to users, ensuring adequate network capacity, 
meeting specifications for reliability and quality of service, etc.  
At the transmission level, a number of cost allocation methods such as postage stamping, megawatt-mile, 
contract path have been proposed or used in various systems.  The use of reference network models, 
and mechanisms such as decoupling, gross-metering and net-metering is observed at the distribution 
level (Rothwell and Gomez 2003, Kirschen and Strbac 2004). 
2.1.2.1 Postage Stamping 
In a method like postage stamping, the UoS charges are uniform across the entire transmission system, 
irrespective of the location of a network user, as long as the usage remains within the local system. The 
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charge may vary with capacity ratings of generators or peak demand ratings of consumers (MW). The 
charge may also be a function of energy consumption (MWh). As a result, the system could choose to 
have both fixed and variable components (MW and MWh) in its UoS charges. To further reflect the usage 
of different consumer types, charges could be differentiated by voltage levels.  Irrespective of the specific 
design, network users pay an average charge that does not identify the cost incurred to supply network 
services to a particular user.  Postage stamping is popular because of its simplicity, but does not provide 
cost-reflective signals to the network user. 
2.1.2.2 Megawatt-Mile or Contract Path  
In transmission cost allocation methods like contract path or megawatt mile, assumptions are made about 
the power flow between a generator and a consumer and the users are responsible for costs related to 
only those network facilities that are in the path of power flow.  Users are therefore charged for the use of 
specific facilities and not the average cost of the entire network.  These methods are error-prone because 
the realized or actual physical path of power flow follows Kirchoff’s laws and may differ significantly from 
the assumed contract path.  In such cases the UoS charges can become severly distorted. 
2.1.2.3 Reference Network Model 
At the distribution level, the marginal costs for particular users could be approximated using an instrument 
such as a reference network model, which simulates the conditions of the real network under a variety of 
scenarios.  Such a model attempts to estimate the economic value of network assets to various network 
users by considering physical power flows, equipment capacities, location of network users and additional 
phenomena such as load fluctuations and congestion. The model resembles the topography of the 
existing network with the corresponding loads and generators. The performance of the real network is 
evaluated as a whole by comparing it to the model results of existing network conditions. As a result, this 
method allows for sophisticated charging schemes that generally reflect the costs incurred to provide 
network services to particular users.  A reference network model becomes harder to implement as the 
complexity of the network and the number of network users increases, but this is also when it becomes 
most valuable for cost allocation.  
2.1.2.4 Gross- or Net-Metering 
Methods such as gross-metering or net-metering are relevant when generation is located at the customer 
site as with distributed generation.  In some cases, the generator may routinely consume more electricity 
than it can produce; the withdrawal from the main network is therefore offset but the customer does not 
input electricity into the network.  A standard, unidirectional metering method is not an issue in such 
cases.  However, some alternative method could be adopted when the generator does input electricity 
into the network, by using a bi-directional meter (net) or even separate meters (gross) for measuring flow 
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into and from the network.  Once the mechanism for measuring the flows has been selected, the issue of 
compensating the generator arises.  Some possible choices for compensation are: (i) no compensation, 
(ii) below the retail rate (wholesale rate, avoided cost rate, etc) (iii) retail rate, or (iv) at a premium rate.  
The initial choice of gross or net metering influences the outcome of the compensation method.  For 
instance, the metered input could be paid a wholesale charge if gross metering (also called net billing) is 
selected, because two separate meters or accounts are being maintained for each direction of flow.  On 
the other hand, when the meter “runs backwards,” it is not possible to measure the counter-factual 
amount of electricity that the customer would have consumed if it wasn’t supplying electricity back to the 
grid.  Thus, pricing the electricity at any single rate, say wholesale or retail, introduces some distortions.  
For either the gross or net system of measurement, more sophisticated methods may be instituted such 
as rolling credits, banking and buy-back.  The choice of metering and compensation methods has 
implications for the scale and technology selection of distributed generation. 
2.1.2.5 Decoupling 
Decoupling is a method in which the revenues and profits of the network company are separated from the 
volume of energy sold.  In principle, the method makes utilities indifferent from sales fluctuations, and 
allows them to reduce network costs by encouraging network users to reduce their overall network usage 
through decreased electricity consumption.  As the rate is not calculated based on the MWh usage of 
networks, the network company’s revenues do not depend on the amount of electricity sold to customers.  
Two main decoupling mechanisms have been proposed: total revenue cap and revenue-per-customer 
cap.  In the revenue cap approach, the total revenue that is earned by the utilities is capped at the 
revenue requirement.  In the revenue-per-customer cap approach, the revenue-per-customer is capped in 
such a way that the revenues from the entire customer base will be sufficient to meet the revenue 
requirement.  In both methods, differences between the allowed revenue requirement and the actual 
revenues can be reconciled.  Although decoupling assures the network company of its future cash 
streams flows, the relationship between prices for various services and the costs of providing those 
services is unclear.  For instance, if the number of customers in a network’s service territory decreases 
during an economic recession, the revenue-per-customer must increase, if the aggregate revenue 
requirement is to be met.  Thus, the price or charge for a service may become meaningless because it 
may not be a good indicator of costs incurred to provide that service. 
 
2.1.3 Commercial Service Charges 
Network companies incur administrative costs for providing services to consumers such as billing, meter 
reading, and customer support that are independent of network operations.  A network company can 
charge for commercial services in the form of a charge that is averaged over all customers irrespective of 
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the number of transactions or services provided to particular customers.  Alternatively, it can charge fixed 
transaction fees that are unique to the type of transaction.  It can further differentiate the charging 
mechanism by charging a minimum or fixed fee to all customers for essential transactions like meter 
reading and billing, and additional fees in the event that a customer is provided with other services.  
Commercial service charges can also be capped at a maximum during a billing cycle to ensure that 
consumers do not overpay for such services. 
 
2.1.4 Energy Policy Charges 
Some network-related costs are policy-driven.  For instance, an electricity system could decide to cross-
subsidize the costs of energy and delivery to low-income or rural communities.  Such charges could be 
recovered from non-subsidized network users on a recurring basis. 
Costs of energy policy that are not related to the network can be bundled with the network costs and 
passed through to the network tariff.  Such charges can be recovered from some or all network users 
through an average charge that is recovered in a lump sum, periodically, or in a limited number of 
installments.  For instance, charges for nuclear decommissioning or the stranded costs of restructuring 
can be recovered as a lump-sum fee or in installments until the associated costs are recovered.  A 
system also has the choice of recovering such costs from the general population or economy, because 
the benefits of such policies are arguably realized not only network users, but others as well. 
  
2.2 Tariff Types 
The network characteristics described above influence the charging mechanism or tariff structure used to 
recover the costs of delivering electricity to consumers.  In restructured or deregulated electricity systems 
with wholesale electricity markets, energy is procured in the wholesale market by distributors or retailers 
on behalf of consumers.  Distribution companies that procure energy in the market incur an expense for 
the energy procured, but no direct costs related to the generation of energy. As a result, the cost of 
energy procured can be passed through as an operating expense through the revenue requirement 
process and to the final consumer tariff.  In fully deregulated systems, end-use customers can choose to 
purchase or negotiate with a competitive retail supplier for the energy component while continuing to 
receive delivery of electricity from the distribution network in whose service territory they are located.  The 
cost of energy can be separated from the network-related cost of delivery in this way. This separation 
results in two types of tariffs: 
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• Network or access tariffs – network-related capital and operating costs  
• Integral tariffs – cost of energy and network-related operating and capital costs 
Thus, 
Integral tariffs = Network Tariffs + Cost of Energy 
 
Figure 1 depicts the relationship between network tariffs and integral tariffs.  
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Figure 1. Regulatory Drivers and Cost Categories influencing Tariff Types 
Integral tariffs are observed in systems that are still regulated or in the process of restructuring. In the 
case of fully regulated systems, customers pay an integral tariff that is approved by the regulatory 
agency. Customers do not have the ability to choose their energy supplier. In systems undergoing 
restructuring, customers have the option to switch to an energy provider that is different from their 
traditional utility, under certain conditions of eligibility. In such situations, they pay network tariffs to their 
distribution company, and energy costs to their energy supplier and this arrangement is referred to as 
competitive supply. However, they may still elect to obtain both energy and delivery from their distribution 
company. In such cases, the distribution company is said to provide default or basic service. 
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It must be noted that the distribution company is usually the billing agent for both competitive and default 
service. Where customers choose competitive supply, the distribution company charges customers on 
behalf of the supplier and subsequently remunerates the supplier.  Some systems that have fully 
separated distribution from retail supply require the competitive supplier to be the billing agent.  
Irrespective of the tariff type used, the revenues received by the network company must be sufficient to 
meet its revenue requirement. 
Since the cost of energy is passed through to the integral tariff in regulated environments and dealt with 
separately in competitive supply, the network tariff is the mechanism through which a network company 
recovers its costs related to transmission, distribution, ancillary services, administration, and commercial 
services. 
   
2.3 Regulatory Drivers 
Regulatory drivers can be thought of as the high-level principles that influence the long-run decisions of 
the network owner.  Given these high-level principles, certain aggregate decisions are forced; lower-level 
principles determine the disaggregated decisions.  The main high-level principles affecting tariff design, 
directly or indirectly, are described here. 
 
2.3.1 Universal Access 
A system may decide to require that all generators and end-use customers have access to the network.  
This is motivated by the possibility that, network companies could deny access to potential network users 
unless they are able to recover the costs of increasing capacity or operating networks in high-cost areas.  
For instance, consumers in rural or sparsely populated areas may not have access to a distribution 
network because of the capacity investments required.  In some cases, generators that are not in close 
proximity to the transmission network or impose stricter reliability requirements on the network may be 
denied access to the network.  Thus, networks can be regulated to ensure universal access with 
provisions for recovering access-related costs for the various types of network users such as generators, 
consumers, or adjacent networks. 
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2.3.2 Quality of Service 
A system could provide varying levels of quality of service to different types of customers, and charge 
them accordingly.  The quality of electricity delivery involves technical dimensions such as reliability and 
power quality, and other dimensions such as the quality of commercial services, described as follows 
(Fumagalli 2007):  
• reliability of supply, i.e. the number and severity of the power supply interruptions to consumers  
• power or voltage quality, i.e. the technical characteristics of electricity such as voltage dips, 
harmonics, or flicker, that may cause disturbances or negatively affect the proper operation of 
apparatus and equipment  
• quality of commercial services, i.e. the quality of services like providing connections, billing, 
responding to outages, etc. 
Reliability of supply and power quality are technical standards and in the domain of both transmission and 
distribution owners and operators.  Commercial quality primarily involves relationships with customers 
and is therefore in the domain of distribution entities and retail suppliers in some cases.  Delivery 
standards are essentially operating standards, and consequently affect the costs incurred by companies 
for the operation and maintenance of physical infrastructure, control centers, staff and dispatch crews, 
etc.  In many cases, the quality of delivery and the corresponding costs can be differentiated for users 
such as large industrial users. 
   
2.3.3 Capacity Adequacy 
Transmission equipment such as lines, transformers, communication and protection devices, control 
mechanisms, etc are expensive and the cost of new investments is much higher than the recurring 
operating costs of the network. The expected useful life of transmission assets is also quite long, usually 
at least 40 years. Additionally, the availability of equipment in only a limited number of standardized 
capacity ratings for equipment makes it difficult to size new capacity additions to exactly match expected 
utilization, or to add capacity incrementally. As a result, new transmission investments occur infrequently 
and in large blocks. The regulation of transmission networks as natural monopolies implies that regulatory 
approval must be received before an investment is made. Transmission companies forecast the need for 
new transmission capacity based on economic and demographic information and propose expansion 
plans to the regulatory agency. When a proposal is approved and capacity is added, the capital costs are 
included in the revenue requirements of the network company. The investment costs and the 
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corresponding return on investments are subsequently recovered from network users through network 
charges (Kirschen and Strbac 2004). 
 
2.3.4 Costs of Energy Policy 
An electricity system may incur certain costs as a whole that are not related to the operation or expansion 
of networks, but are outcomes of regulatory decisions or energy policies. Such costs include moratoria or 
decommissioning of nuclear power plants and feed-in tariffs for renewable generation. In systems that 
have undergone restructuring or deregulation, stranded asset costs and the costs of transitioning to 
market-based systems may have been incurred.  Additionally, some policies may involve energy and 
network costs such as the cross subsidization of low-income or extra-peninsular populations.  An 
electricity system may choose to recover such energy policy costs from all network users by including the 
corresponding charges in the network tariffs.  However, it could be argued that the benefits of such 
energy policies are accrued by the economy as a whole and that the cost of energy policies should be 
recovered from the entire population, not just electricity network users. 
 
3. ISSUES RELATED TO TARIFF STRUCTURE 
3.1 Choice of Principles 
In light of all the choices available to an electricity system while designing the tariff structure, a number of 
economic or regulatory principles can be used as a guide, based on the goals of the system. 
System Sustainability Principles:  
Principles that are essential for the successful functioning of networks 
Universal access - electricity is an essential service to which all consumers should be 
entitled 
Complete cost recovery – all accredited system costs must be recovered for the system 
to be financially viable 
Additivity of components – various tariff components must add up to give the total 
revenue requirement to be recovered 
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Economic Efficiency Principles:  
Principles that minimize economic losses and ensure an efficient system 
Productive efficiency – network services should be delivered to consumers at the 
lowest possible cost 
Allocative efficiency – consumers should be charged in accordance with how much 
they value the network services provided 
Equity – all consumers that belong to a certain category and demand the same network 
services should be charged the same, irrespective of the end-use of electricity 
Consumer Protection Principles:  
Principles that safeguard the interests of consumers 
Transparency – the methodology and results of tariff allocations should be published 
and available to network participants 
Simplicity – the methodology and results of the tariff allocations should be easy to 
understand 
Stability – the tariff structure should result in stable electricity prices in the short-term, 
with gradual changes in the long-term 
Although regulatory institutions believe that these principles should influence the design of tariffs, they 
may not choose to implement each and every one of them. In fact, the inherent conflict between some 
principles makes it infeasible for their simultaneous implementation. For instance, it is reasonable to 
expect that tariffs that are productively and allocationally efficient are so complex in design that they are 
not consistent with the principle of simplicity.  A good example of this is network charges obtained from a 
complex reference network model that is difficult to understand by any who are not familiar with the 
modeling techniques.  Thus, a system that desires simplicity will also have to bear the inefficiencies 
associated with a tariff structure that ignores economic principles.  Similarly, a system may consciously 
choose not to adopt a principle such as equity so that certain low-income customers can be protected. In 
other words, low-income customers could have a low tariff even though they impose a cost of delivery 
identical or similar to high-income customers.  In this case, tariffs may not be fully efficient but could still 
satisfy other system requirements such as universal access and complete cost recovery. The choice of 
regulatory principles thus implies a variety of trade-offs in the design of tariff structures. 
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3.2  Siting of Generation 
The choice of the provisions for connection charges in a system can influence the siting of generation, if 
generators are required to pay connection charges. The direct connection and reinforcement costs for a 
certain location in the network could be much higher than those for another location in the network. For 
instance, connecting wind generation from a location with abundant wind resources far from an existing 
network may be extremely expensive, and the generator might choose a different location with similar 
wind resources or a different generation source like a natural gas plant in order to be located closer to the 
network and thus reduce connection costs. If generators are responsible for a large fraction of this cost or 
the total cost, they may choose a generation technology other than wind.  Connection charges for 
generators could therefore be structured to influence the siting of generation. 
If generators are not required to pay connection charges, either shallow or deep, the costs will be borne 
by the rest of the network users, viz. customers, thereby increasing customer tariffs.  Moreover, 
generators will not have any incentives to choose a connection point that will minimize connection costs, 
which is inconsistent with the principle of productive efficiency. This structure is also inconsistent with the 
principle of allocative efficiency, that is, the costs for a shared network should be borne by all network 
users in proportion to the value they place on network services.  At the very least, generators could be 
charged a shallow connection charge as an incentive to optimize their location with respect to the 
network.  
 
3.3 Selection and Scale of Generation Technology 
The issue of technology selection arises out of the provisions for Use-of-System charges for generators in 
an electricity system and the extent of network capacity additions and reinforcements required for a 
particular generation technology. As described above, in cases where the cost of network reinforcements 
is fully allocated to consumers through UoS charges, it has not been recovered through deep connection 
charges to generators. For an intermittent generation source like wind, more sophisticated and expensive 
reinforcements might be required to ensure the system’s quality of service.  In such situations, UoS 
charges for consumers increase.  Additionally, generators may not have an incentive to reduce the cost of 
reinforcements in the absence of UoS charges to them. 
In the case of generation connected at low voltage distribution levels or distributed generation, generators 
are located close to consumers and may sometimes offset the use of the higher voltage levels of the 
network.  As a result, they could be charged less for network usage and reinforcements at higher voltage 
levels and more for increased low voltage level usage.   
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It is believed that certain levels of distributed generation may in fact decrease the need for reinforcements 
or network capacity at higher voltage levels, thereby benefiting all network users (Cossent et al 2009).  
However, distributed generation that uses intermittent sources such as wind or solar energy may continue 
to require adequate network capacity to deliver back up electricity to those network areas. In such cases, 
the cost of reinforcements or network capacity is not avoided. The benefit and cost contributions of such 
generators cannot be factored in to the UoS charges through a simple postage stamping mechanism.  A 
reference network model could be used to approximate the charges to be allocated to individual network 
users in networks with distributed generation.   
Tariffs involving gross- or net-metering mechanisms that are reflective of network use could also be 
implemented.  If net-metering is chosen, it is not feasible to apply differentiated tariffs to electricity 
withdrawn and supplied to the network.  As a result, a distributed generator may receive the retail rate for 
the electricity supplied to the network, even though the rate includes charges for costs incurred at higher 
voltage levels.  By off-setting the use of the higher voltage levels, it could be argued that the 
compensation rate should correspondingly decrease.  This issue could be avoided through gross-
metering, if network usage (or usage offsets) are appropriately taken into account while setting the 
compensation rate.  Again, a reference network model could be employed, but the complexity of the 
differentiated tariffs must also be acknowledged.  
   
3.4 Maintaining Quality of Service 
The principle of complete cost recovery along with quality of service requirements may influence the 
magnitude of UoS charges. Network companies incur certain operating costs in network maintenance, 
procuring ancillary services, etc to provide a certain quality of service to network users, which are 
subsequently recovered through UoS charges. In the absence of specifications or incentives for 
maintaining a desired quality of service, network companies could avoid such costs to maximize the profit 
they can earn if they are allowed to recover their revenue requirements.  Additionally, expenses for 
maintaining quality of service may not be efficient, resulting in UoS charges that are higher than 
necessary.  To ensure a desired quality of service with reasonable UoS charges, a number of regulatory 
instruments could be used:  
• Data Publication: By publishing statistics related to network company performance, a system 
can provide consumers information about network company operations. Publicizing such 
information may provide companies with an incentive to improve performance. 
• Performance Standards: An electricity system could specify minimum quality standards for 
performance accompanied by financial penalties for non-compliance. This instrument acts as an 
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incentive for companies to make expenses that will result in the desired minimum quality of 
service.  Performance standards accompanied by financial penalties for non-compliance and 
financial rewards for improvements can provide incentives to ensure that the quality of service is 
provided efficiently. For instance, network companies may be rewarded if they can provide the 
desired quality of service by minimizing the costs incurred in doing so. 
• Premium Quality Contracts: A system could allow bilateral contracts between network 
companies and certain consumers who place a higher value on quality of service than other 
consumers. For instance, a large customer such as a manufacturing company may be willing to 
pay a premium for a guaranteed quality of service.  By allowing such customers to enter into a 
separate contract with the company, the costs for enhanced quality of service do not have to be 
recovered from other network users.  Thus, customers pay UoS charges that are reflective of 
their desired quality of service. 
The first two instruments inherently require the regulator to assess how consumers value the quality of 
delivery. On the other hand, quality contracts can be negotiated directly by network companies and 
consumers based on their preferences (Fumagalli et al 2007). 
 
3.5 Ensuring Adequacy of Capacity 
Network users pay for new network capacity investments through UoS charges. The long-term objective 
in transmission and distribution planning is to ensure that adequate capacity exists to meet the expected 
future demand for electricity at desired levels of reliability and quality.  
In most cases, the network owner and operator is responsible for planning and new investments. 
However, some systems have separated the long-term function of regional transmission planning and 
investment from the short-term operation and maintenance of networks to ensure that network 
investments are made prudently. Independent System Operators (ISOs), Regional Transmission 
Organizations (RTOs) or regulatory agencies may perform this role.  Some electricity systems allow for 
unregulated companies other than the monopoly transmission network company to propose and build 
transmission capacity, known as merchant transmission. The merchant investor provides the capital for 
such investments, which it expects to recover through operating revenues. 
The decisions to invest in new infrastructure are partly related to any prescribed performance standards, 
as discussed above. But more importantly, new capital investment decisions depend on current capacity 
planning that is based on expectations of future demand. Furthermore, the rate of return on investments 
also influences the investment decision. If the rate is too low, the network company does not have an 
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incentive to invest, leading to an inadequacy of capacity, congestion and higher delivery prices.  A high 
rate of return may result in overinvestment, where capacity could be underutilized. Thus, expansion of 
network infrastructure and investments should be made carefully to ensure that network users do not 
overpay for inadequate or underutilized capacity. 
 
3.6 Cross-subsidization of Tariffs 
The issue of cross-subsidization arises under the principle of universal access when certain categories of 
customers are charged lower tariffs than other customers for similar network services. For example, a low 
income customer in a particular service area may be charged a low tariff compared to a high income 
customer in the same area. Some of the costs of delivery to the low-income customers are thus borne by 
other customers to ensure that all customers have access to electricity. 
The cost of delivery for a certain category of customers may be much higher than other customers as in 
the case of rural populations, or countries with large geographical distances between generation and load 
centers. In such electricity systems, postage-stamp tariffs based on the principle of equity would result in 
a higher average UoS charges for consumers in relatively low cost areas, thereby subsiding the 
customers in high cost areas. Such a tariff structure is inconsistent with the principle of allocative 
efficiency, but could be deemed fair across the population as a whole. 
 
3.7 Incidence of Energy Policy Costs 
The recovery of energy policy costs such as stranded costs of restructuring or nuclear moratoria in 
network tariffs may be essential for overall electricity system sustainability. However, an electricity system 
is not faced with the issue of cost allocation with regard to these costs because they are not incurred 
while providing network services to particular users.  In some systems, the high costs of energy from 
renewable sources is subsidized due to the policy goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and 
reducing reliance on fuel sources such as coal or gas.  The benefits of reduced emissions and fuel 
diversity are accrued by the entire population.  Once again, calculating the marginal benefit accrued and 
the marginal costs to certain users is unfeasible as in the case of some network related issues.  But a 
system could decide to recover such policy related costs from the population as a whole instead of 
captive electricity network users only. 
Having discussed the various issues that influence tariff designs, we now examine the designs in four 
different electricity systems: Australia, New England (USA), Portugal and Spain.  The country studies 
                     
Page 25 of 108 
illustrate a variety of choices in the context of natural monopoly regulation, the shared nature of networks 
and the provision of incentives to network users through tariff designs.   
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PART II :  COUNTRY STUDIES 
NEW ENGLAND (USA) 
End-use customers in New England pay network tariffs that are clearly delineated in terms of their 
components such as network related costs and energy policy costs.  The delineation allows customers to 
gain an understanding of the cost of delivering network services, in comparison with energy policy costs. 
Energy policy costs are a small fraction of network tariffs, and therefore do not significantly distort the cost 
reflectiveness of network tariffs.  A single tariff design is applied to all transmission networks, irrespective 
of physical and ownership characteristics, which results in fixed transmission tariff rates across the New 
England system.  Distribution network tariffs vary by state and have a moderate degree of differentiation 
by voltage level and time of use, but are similar in structure across the distribution utilities.  Some 
distribution networks calculate network tariff rates for specific zones within their service areas, which 
allows customers in each zone to bear the cost of delivering electricity in that zone.  A high degree of 
geographical differentiation in network tariffs is more cost reflective than an average rate across the 
utilities' entire service area. Distributed generators in New England receive a subsidy because they are 
paid for network use while supplying net-metered electricity back to the grid, through a retail rate that 
includes network tariff components. 
1. SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS 
The New England region, comprised of six relatively small states in the northeastern United States, is 
served by a single interconnected electricity system.  Although each of the states have separate 
structures for network ownership and regulation, the states’ small size and geographical proximity 
facilitates the operation of the system by a single independent system operator (ISO).  The ISO model 
has implications for the market and network organization of the six states, and also influences the 
network tariffs in the region. 
Independent System Operator-New England (ISO-NE) is an independent, not-for-profit corporation that 
oversees the wholesale power generation and transmission system in the New England area.  It also 
manages wholesale market operations and system-wide planning.  ISO-NE was formed in 1997 to serve 
the six states of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont.  Figure 
1 depicts the ISO-NE region sub-divided primarily along state lines.  The sub-regions serve as market 
zones for the wholesale electricity market and network operated by ISO-NE.  The state of Massachusetts 
(MA) is further sub-divided into three regions, Western-Central MA, Northern MA and Southern MA, due 
to its high population density.     
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Figure 1.  Independent System Operator-New England (ISO-NE) Region 
Source: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 2008 
 
1.1 Generation 
Although ISO-NE operates the bulk power system and wholesale-market, it does not own any generation 
capacity.  Generation is owned by independent power producers (IPPs) (or merchant generators), 
municipal utilities, and distributed generators.  More than 350 generating resources supply electricity to 
the system, including natural gas and oil-fired power plants, hydroelectric dams, coal and nuclear 
stations, biomass plants, etc.  Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the power generation fleet in the 
ISO-NE region. 
Generation in ISO-NE operates under the framework of a wholesale electricity market.  Bilateral contracts 
between generators and customers are permitted, with any imbalances purchased in the spot market.  
The market is therefore a net pool.  The spot market has day-ahead and real-time segments.  
Transactions are based on Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP), a wholesale pricing mechanism that 
reflects the costs of energy, congestion and transmission losses specific to particular locations in the 
network.  ISO-NE procures ancillary services such as peaking reserve capacity and frequency and 
regulation through parallel ancillary services markets.  Payments to ancillary services providers are made 
through monthly and annual settlement processes. 
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As shown in Table 1, over 40% of the capacity is natural gas, which is also the marginal fuel type.  That 
is, the market clearing price is usually the price received by the last natural gas plant to be dispatched.  
Most generators that participate in the market are independent power producers, with over 80% of the 
generating capacity.  Many traditional municipal utility generators with small generating capacities also 
supply to the market.  About half of these are utilities with hydroelectric capacity located in the state of 
Vermont.  The remaining utilities and CHP producers do not supply to the market, and generate electricity 
for their own use.  The total market capacity available is therefore approximately 33,000 MW.  No 
significant additions to generating capacity have been realized in recent years.  Capacity additions have 
been incremental and typically augmentations of existing plants.   
Table 1.  Generation Sector Profile in ISO-NE 
Data Source:   ISO-NE, EIA (2009) 
Energy Source Number of Producers Nameplate Capacity Percentage Capacity
(MW)
Coal 11                                      3,052                                8%
Hydroelectric 188                                    1,859                                5%
Natural Gas 60                                      14,948                              42%
Nuclear 4                                        4,638                                13%
Petroleum 89                                      8,176                                23%
Renewables 37                                      3,315                                9%
Total 389 35,988 100%
Independent Power 
Producers (IPPs) 233                                    30,044                              84%
Utility Generators 82                                      2,638                                7%
Combined Heat & 
Power (CHP) 74                                      3,307                                9%
Total 389 35,988 100%
 
A forward capacity market (FCM) was initiated in 2008 to ensure an adequate supply of electricity in the 
short- to medium-term.  The demand is projected three years in advance, and annual auctions are held to 
purchase the necessary supply commitments from generators.  The FCM also has provisions for the 
participation of demand-side resources, where customers can compete with generators to offer demand 
reductions in lieu of securing additional generation capacity.  Payments are made to such customers for 
reducing their electricity demand.  ISO-NE estimates that 2000 MW of demand-side resources are 
available in the capacity market. 
The existence of a wholesale market that is separate from network-related operations and services allows 
for a distinction to be made between energy and network tariffs.  It also enables the existence of a retail 
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supply sector.  The main implication for tariffs is architectural, i.e. the tariff design is is comprised of 
separate charges for energy and network services.  
 
1.2 Networks 
ISO-NE only operates the transmission-level network in the New England region; it does not own any 
network assets.  Networks are owned by separate companies, some of which own both transmission and 
distribution assets.  A transmission company may own networks that extend beyond state lines and 
transactions are therefore subject to federal regulation by FERC.  Similarly, companies may own 
distribution networks in more than one state, but the assets are regulated at the state level by state utility 
commissions. 
The transmission networks in New England are primarily owned by seven network companies.  These 
companies constitute approximately 98% of the network capacity in the region.  The rest of the 
transmission networks are owned by small municipal utilities and electric power cooperatives. The 
network characteristics of the seven main companies are summarized in Table 2.   
Table 2.  Network Company Characteristics in ISO-NE (2008) 
Data Source:   ISO-NE (2009) 
Network Location Ownership
Average 
Network 
Load
Regulatory 
Structure
Asset 
Base
Annual 
Revenue 
Requirements
(state)
(monthly, 
MW) ($ millions) ($ millions)
Bangor HydroElectric (BHE) ME Investor-owned 252        Rate-of-return 138.0        30.3                 
Central Maine Power (CMP) ME Investor-owned 1,418     Rate-of-return 142.3        46.7                 
National Grid MA, NH, RI Investor-owned 5,772     Rate-of-return 560.0        199.5               
Northeast Utilities (NU) CT, MA, NH Investor-owned 7,173     Rate-of-return 2,231.5     553.5               
NSTAR MA, NH, RI Investor-owned 4,183     Rate-of-return 541.4        163.6               
United Illuminating (UIL) CT, MA, NH Investor-owned 716        Rate-of-return 395.0        121.4               
Vermont Transmission 
Company (VTransCo) VT Public 852        Rate-of-return 281.2        85.5                 
Total     20,366         4,289                 1,201 
 
Six of the companies are investor owned utilities, while VTransCo is owned by a consortium of 
municipalities.  All the network companies are regulated through a rate-of-return mechanism, where the 
companies recover their annual revenue requirements (ARR) plus a reasonable rate of return on 
investments.  ISO-NE is responsible for calculating the network tariffs for each network company in the 
region.  The network companies are regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.   
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Figure 2 displays the geographical distribution of these networks in the New England Region.  The 
network companies’ regulated asset base (RAB) as a share of the total RAB for the companies are used 
to gain an understanding of the size and concentration of the networks.  The networks are most dense in 
the states of Connecticut (CT), Massachusetts (MA), New Hampshire (NH), and Rhode Island (RI).  
Northeast Utilities (52%) is the largest transmission network in terms of RAB, followed by National Grid 
and NSTAR.  The companies in Maine are much smaller.  Vermont Transmission Company (VTransCo) 
owns the entire transmission network in Vermont (VT) and contributes to approximately 7 % of the total 
ARR for the networks in the region.  The relative size and density of the networks is an indicator of the 
residential, commercial and industrial demographics of the states. 
The total length of transmission lines in the region is approximately 8,000 miles.  In addition to networks, 
there are twelve transmission interconnections to the networks in the adjacent New York ISO and Eastern 
Canadian provinces.  Of these, the Cross Sound Cable is a merchant transmission line running between 
Connecticut and Long Island in New York, and is owned by a private holding company.  The 24-mile long 
HVDC submarine cable can provide up to 330 MW of transmission capacity.   
Bangor HE
3.2 %
Central Maine
3.3 %
Northeast 
Utilities
52.0 %
PSNH
WMEC
CL&P
VTransCo
6.6 %
National Grid 
13.1 %
UIL
9.2 % NSTAR 12.6 %
Total Asset Base
$ 4,290 Million 
(2009)
 
Figure 2.  Concentration of Transmission Networks in New England by ARR (2006) 
Data Source: ISO-NE Rate Setting Data (2006) 
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New transmission investments in the New England system that are not new generator interconnections 
are primarily of three types:  
• Reliability upgrades – investments to preserve or enhance the reliability of the system as a whole 
that is proposed as a consequence of a system-wide reliability study 
• Market efficiency upgrades – investments designed to reduce bulk system-wide costs where the 
net present value of the reduction in system costs exceeds the net present value of the 
transmission investment 
• Elective upgrades – a voluntary investment that a generator or network owner may undertake for 
operation as a merchant facility or other reasons 
The ISO rules provide due processes for each type of investment which include requirements for 
applications and permits, system impact studies, project design and standards, and cost allocation.  In the 
first two cases, investments are added to the rate base of the relevant network company and 
subsequently recovered through the annual revenue requirements of the company.  These charges are 
passed through to customers through the network tariffs.  Any entity proposing an elective upgrade is 
responsible for a 100% of the costs of the upgrade, and is not permitted to pass this through to the annual 
revenue requirements of any network in the system.  Thus, procedures for investing in new transmission 
are available and employed in the ISO-NE system, with provisions for allocation and recovery of 
investments from network users.  However, these costs are incurred and recovered only after the new 
investments are approved.  Decisions regarding the necessity and prudency of reliability or market 
efficiency upgrades are therefore a separate issue.  Such decisions are ultimately made by the state 
utility commissions in whose jurisdictions the investments will occur, and under FERC oversight where 
applicable.  
 
2. TARIFFS 
The design of network tariffs in the ISO-NE region has two important characteristics. Firstly, ISO-NE 
applies one tariff design at the transmission level to the networks of all transmission owners in the New 
England Power Pool and transmission-level network users.  Secondly, at the distribution level, similar 
network tariff designs are employed by the different states, with some provisions to reflect the unique 
characteristics of the respective states.  In all cases, the network tariffs are clearly and transparently 
passed through to the final customer, as observed from the rate structure. 
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2.1 General Tariff Design 
Table 4 summarizes the general network tariff design in the ISO-NE region, inclusive of transmission and 
distribution. 
Table 4.  Network Tariff Design in New England 
Data Source: ISO-NE, State commissions 
Cost Components Customer Type Cost Allocation Rate Structure
(by consumption)
Generator Dedicated (deep)
Large Dedicated Fixed monthly ($/month)
Medium Dedicated Fixed monthly ($/month)
Small Shallow; average Fixed monthly ($/month)
Distributed Generator Dedicated Fixed monthly ($/month)
Large Zonal, average by voltage category
Monthly demand 
($/kW/month) or 
($/kVA/month) and 
volume ($/kWh)
Medium Zonal, average by voltage category
Monthly demand 
($/kW/month) or 
($/kVA/month) and 
volume ($/kWh)
Small Zonal, average by voltage category Volume ($/kWh)
Distributed Generator Zonal, average by voltage category Only if consuming; by 
size as aboove
Large Postage stamp Monthly capacity ($/kW/month)
Medium Postage stamp Monthly capacity ($/kW/month)
Generator Postage stamp Monthly capacity ($/kW/month)
Commercial 
Services
Meter installations and 
reading;  billing services All Zonal average Fixed monthly ($/month)
Renewable Energy All System-wide surcharge Volume ($/kWh)
Restructuring All Average by voltage category and 
customer type Volume ($/kWh)
Energy Policy
Transmission 
UoS Charges
Shared network use; 
Common services like 
ancillary services; 
Administrative costs of 
network operation
Independent System Operator-New England
Distribution 
UoS Charges
Shared network use; 
Common services like 
system control; 
Administrative costs of 
network operation
Connection 
Charges
Connection assets; 
Network reinforcement
 
Connection charges in the ISO-NE differ by customer category, and vary from “shallow charges,” “deep” 
charges,” and intermediate charges.  Generators connected to the transmission network are usually 
responsible for a hundred percent of the direct connection costs, plus at least 50% of the network 
reinforcements depending on the nature of the interconnection and necessary upgrades.  Distributed 
generators are charged deep connection costs; they pay for direct connection costs on-site as well as 
network reinforcements in the distribution system.  End-use customers such as small residential and 
commercial customers pay shallow charges for line extensions, with the cost of network reinforcements 
averaged across all customers at the respective voltage level.  Large end-use customers generally pay 
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shallow charges for connection to the transmission or higher-voltage distribution network unless any 
network reinforcements are solely for their benefit, and will not be used by other customers at that voltage 
level.  The design of connection charges primarily affects the siting decisions of generators and 
customers.  However, most network users in the New England region are located very close to existing 
networks because of the dense population and relatively small geographical distances.  Decisions 
regarding the capacity and type of distributed generation will be affected, because such generators are 
responsible for deep connection charges.   
Distribution use-of-system charges are calculated by network zones, whereby customers are responsible 
for the average network costs in their zone.  For instance, the network rates for customers in different 
parts of the Boston metropolitan area differ by the zone in which they are located.  Small residential and 
commercial customers are charged by the volume of electricity consumed ($/kWh).  Large commercial 
customers are charged by both maximum monthly demand ($/kW/month or $/kVa/month) and volume 
consumed ($/kWh).  Distributed generators are responsible for the network charges applicable to their 
network zone and customer type for the portion of electricity consumed from the distribution network.  
Thus, they are treated as typical distribution-level customers when they draw electricity from the network.   
Transmission use-of-system charges are identical in design across the entire ISO-NE system.  A postage 
stamp rate is calculated for all transmission level network users in the form a capacity charge ($/kW).  
Transmission-level tariffs are billed monthly and reconciled annually.  The postage-stamp rate does not 
allow for a reflection of the cost of network services at the transmission level by location.  However, the 
locational marginal pricing mechanism in the energy market serves this purpose partially, as it includes 
congestion costs in the energy price at each load zone in the system.  Thus, siting decisions for 
generators and customers will be influenced in part by the LMP.  
Charges for commercial services such as meter reading, billing and other administrative expenses are 
recovered through a fixed monthly charge ($/month).  These costs are added to the fixed monthly 
connection charge.   
An energy policy charge such as the cost of procuring renewable energy to meet Renewable Portfolio 
Standards is identical for all customers where applicable and recovered as a surcharge, as in the state of 
Massachusetts.  The renewable energy charge is calculated and revised semi-annually and levied by 
consumption volume ($/kWh).  Costs pertaining to restructuring and recovery of stranded asset costs in 
both transmission and distribution are calculated as an average by voltage category and customer type, 
also charged by consumption volume ($/kWh).   
The separation of charges for network-related costs from energy costs allows a good understanding of 
the costs of network ownership and operation and the allocation of these costs to different types of 
network users.  Energy policy charges are passed through to all end-use customers. 
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2.2 Transmission Network Tariffs 
As the system operator for the region, ISO-NE is responsible for calculating, allocating and billing 
transmission-level network tariffs, based on information supplied by the respective networks.  ISO-NE 
performs these functions in accordance with the Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT), a set of 
regulations and guidelines governing the network and market operations for the New England system 
which are approved by the FERC.  The OATT is enabled by a series of legally-binding agreements 
between the ISO and the network companies that comprise the New England Power Pool.  The ISO 
calculates and reports the annual revenue requirements for each network to the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, because the network ownership and market transactions are not always within 
state boundaries.  As such, the regulation of transmission network tariffs is ultimately subject to federal 
oversight. 
Table 5.  Postage-stamped Regional Network Services Tariff for 2009 
Data Source: ISO-NE (2009) 
 
Legend:
  PTF - Pool Transmission Facility Pre 1997 - before restructuring
  PTO - Pool Transmission Operator Post 1996 - after restructuring
  RNS - Regional Network Service
 
Table 6.  Postage-stamped Through or Out Services Tariff for 2009 
Data Source: ISO-NE (2009) 
Export over the Pool Transmission Facilities to TOUT Service Rates ($/MW-hr.)
HydroQuebec (Canada) $6.8432
New Brunswick (Canada) $6.8432
New York $0.0000
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Transmission network tariffs are postage stamped for Regional Network Services (RNS), i.e. all network 
services provided within the pool transmission facilities in the New England control region.  Based on the 
different annual revenue requirements for each transmission network, ISO-NE calculates a single RNS 
tariff that is levied on transmission network users in the form of a $/kW/year charge.  The total payments 
collected for RNS serves are re-distributed to the network companies in accordance with their ARR in an 
annual settlement process.  The RNS tariff does not include charges for local services that are provided 
within the networks of individual companies outside the pool transmission facilities.  Table 5 depicts a 
calculation for the RNS tariff for the year 2009. 
Some services known as Through or Out services (TOUT) are provided to network users that are located 
outside the New England control region.  An example of a TOUT service is a energy supplied to a 
network user in an interconnecting region such as Canada or New York, which originates or passes 
through the New England network.  Charges for such services are recovered through a separate TOUT 
tariff (also postage-stamped) that is levied only on customers availing of such services.  The TOUT tariff 
for 2009 is listed in Table 6. 
ISO-NE also recovers charges from network customers for common services such as scheduling, 
dispatch and control services and other ancillary services which it then pays to parties providing such 
services.  Administrative costs for the operation and management of the ISO are also recovered through 
annual charges. 
Figure 3 depicts the financial flows at the transmission level across the ISO-NE system for a single year, 
with the ISO as the billing agent.  Various network services are accounted for as separate components of 
the charges to customers.  The total sum collected is then redistributed to networks and ancillary service 
providers, less revenues to ISO-NE.  The flows do not include energy-related transactions which are 
managed through a separate market settlement process between generators and customers, with ISO-
NE again serving as a billing agent.  Network usage accounts for 73% of total payments, with 99% of 
usage revenues for Regional Network Service.  Ancillary services payments constitute roughly 10%.  
About 14% is retained by ISO-NE for to cover its operating and administrative expenses. 
Transmission network tariffs are passed through to end-use customers, as observed in the final network 
rates.  Although some network companies such as NSTAR and National Grid own both transmission and 
distribution assets, tariffs for each network type are calculated and charged separately. 
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$ 587.5
Network Use
$ 139.7
Administrative 
$ 77
Ancil lary Services
TOUT Customers
• $    5.9  (   1%)
RNS Customers
• $ 581.6  ( 99%)
OATT Admin
• SCD - $  27.4
$  27.4 (19.6 %)
ISO Tariff
• SCD - $  23.1
• EAS - $  53.1
• RAS - $  36.1
$ 112.3 ( 
80.4 %)
OATT Ancillary
• CC    - $   18.8
• VAR   - $   46.0       
• BS      - $  10.3
• SCSR - $    1.8
$  77.0  (100 %)$ 804.2 Million
ISO-NE Transmission Network Charges: 
Components and Flows
( 2007 $ mil lions )
Generators
Transmission
Owners
ISO
73.0 %
17.4 %
9.6 %
Billing Agent
Network Use
• $ 587.5 (95.5%)
OATT Admin
• $   27.4  (4.5%)
$  614.9
ISO Tariff
• SCD - $  23.1
• EAS - $  53.1
• RAS - $  36.1
$ 112.3
KEY:
• BS  - Black Start
• CC  - Capacity Charge
• EAS – Energy Administration Service
• OATT – Open Access Transmission Tar iff
• RAS – Reliability Administration Service
• RNS – Regional Network Service
• SCD – Scheduling, Control and Dispatch
• SCRS – Special Constraint Resource Services
• SRPS – System Restoration and Planning Service
• TOUT - Through or Out Customer
• VAR – Reactive Supply & Voltage Control
OATT Ancillary
• CC    - $   18.8
• VAR   - $   46.0       
• BS      - $  10.3
• SCSR - $    1.8
$  77.0
14 %
3.4 %
73.0 %
9.6 %
 
Figure 3.  ISO-NE Transmission Financial Flows (2007) 
Data Source: ISO-NE (2009) 
       
2.3 Distribution Network Tariffs 
Each state in the New England region has different distribution network companies operating as investor-
owned utilities or municipal utilities.  Consequently, the distribution network tariffs vary by state, and by 
the network characteristics of each utility.  The network tariffs are approved by the state utility 
commissions for the respective states.  
The tariff design for NSTAR, a large investor-owned utility in the state of Massachusetts, is representative 
of the designs in the region and is therefore used for the purpose of this analysis.   NSTAR owns both 
transmission and distribution assets, and its tariffs are approved by the Massachusetts Department of 
Public Utilities.  NSTAR primarily provides network services to end-use customers in the Massachusetts 
                     
Page 37 of 108 
region.  It procures energy on behalf of customers and supplies it to customers as a retail supplier.  
Selected network rates for some of NSTAR’s customer categories are shown in Table 7.  These charges 
are applicable to a single zone within NSTAR’s service area and are therefore unique to that zone.  
Charges are itemized separately as connection, transmission, distribution, and energy policy charges and 
appear in a customer’s monthly bill in a similar format. 
Table 7.  Network Tariffs for NSTAR Customers in the Cambridge Zone (2009) 
Data Source: NSTAR (2009) 
Tariff
Category Fixed Transition
Energy 
Conservation
Renewable 
Energy
($/month ) ( c/kWh ) ( c/kWh ) ( c/kWh )
General 
Residential (R-1) 6.87 (0.56) 0.25 0.05
Residential 
Heating (R-3) 7.77 (0.56) 0.25 0.05
Residential 
Assistance (R-2) 1.03 (0.56) 0.25 0.05
General Business 
(G-0) (Load < 10 
kW/month) 4.62 (0.56) 0.25 0.05
Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak
Residential Time-
of-Use 10.47 3.32 0.00 10.09 1.90 0.55 0.25 0.05
Business Time-of-
Use (G-6) 8.22 4.69 0.00 6.28 2.27 0.56 0.25 0.05
Demand Energy Demand Energy
($/month ) ( $/kW ) ( c/kWh ) ( $/kW ) ( c/kWh ) ( $/kW ) ( c/kWh ) ( c/kWh )
General Business 
(G-1) (Load < 10 
kW/month) 7.32 3.32 0.00
3.76 (first 10 kW) 
7.01 (over 10 kW) 1.07 (1.68) 0.25 0.05
 Business Time-of-
Use (G-4) (10 kW 
< Load < 100 
kW/month) 10.92 4.03 0.00 4.16 (during peak) 0.98 (2.36) 0.25 0.05
($/month ) ( $/kVA ) ( c/kWh ) ( $/kVA ) ( c/kWh ) ( $/kVA ) ( c/kWh ) ( c/kWh )
Large Business (G-
2) 90.00
2.84 (first 100 kVA) 
5.83 (over 100 kVA) 0.00
4.06 (first 100 kVa)  
5.03 (over 100 
kVa) 0.89
$1.27 /kVa 
& $(0.87) 
/kWh 0.25 0.05
Differentiated by Demand
1.48
1.74
1.48
3.71
4.36
0.56
Differentiated by Time-of-Use
1.38
Network Energy Policy
Transmission
( c/kWh )
Distribution
( c/kWh )
3.30
Fixed Rate
 
Transmission charges are those passed through to distribution networks as transmission customers 
procuring Regional Network Service.  They are averaged across voltage categories in the particular zone 
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in the form of a volume-based charge for small customers ($/kWh), and a demand- ($/kW or $/kVA) and 
volume-based charge ($/kWh) for large customers.   
Distribution charges are similar in structure to the transmission charges.  Small customers pay a monthly 
connection charge and a volume-based charge ($/kWh).  Large customers pay the appropriate demand-
based charges ($/kW or $/kVA) in addition to the volume-based charge.  Customers can select a time-of-
use tariff with differentiated charges for peak and off-peak periods.  The monthly connection charge 
includes connection costs as well as charges for commercial and administrative services.   
Some customer groups such as low-income households and senior citizens can avail themselves of a 
special tariff category called the Residential Assistance tariff, which offers discounted connection and 
distribution-related charges.  The access and network service costs to such consumer groups are 
therefore subsidized by other distribution customers.   
All customers connected to NSTAR’s network are responsible for certain types of energy policy charges.  
Transition charges are included to recover the stranded costs and administrative costs originating in the 
process of restructuring.  Such charges are volume-based in the case of small customers and demand-
based in the case of large customers.  The charges are calculated as an average across each voltage 
category.  In NSTAR’s case, consumers receive a credit to reflect payments being made to NSTAR.  
Energy conservation charges are designed to support NSTAR’s energy efficiency programs, while 
renewable energy charges recover the costs of procuring electricity from renewable energy sources such 
as paying for Renewable Energy Credits and payments to net-metered distributed generators.  
Conservation and renewable energy charges are identical across all distribution customers.   
Distributed generators are responsible for net-metered payments, in addition to dedicated or deep 
connection costs.  That is, when such customers consume more electricity than they generate, they are 
charged for the net electricity consumed according to the appropriate customer category.  On the other 
hand, they receive payments when they supply surplus electricity back to the distribution network.  The 
retail rate used is calculated as the sum of the energy, transmission, distribution, transition and energy 
policy components.  Thus, distribution users pay for network use when they draw electricity from the grid, 
but receive payments for network use when they supply to the grid.  This subsidy is available to all 
renewable distributed generation technologies including solar, wind and biomass generators. 
Distribution customers may choose to obtain their electricity from NSTAR as the retail supplier 
(basic/default service) or a competitive retail supplier.  Customers are typically placed on basic service, 
unless they elect to contract with a competitive supplier.  NSTAR procures electricity as a market 
participant from generators on behalf of its basic service customers.  Procurements take the form of short- 
and medium-term power purchase agreements for a large fraction of NSTAR’s demand, with the balance 
obtained through spot market transactions.  NSTAR’s energy procurement costs are passed through to 
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basic service customers through rates approved by the Department of Public Utilities.  On the other hand, 
the rates offered by competitive suppliers are not subject to regulation.  However, NSTAR still acts as a 
billing agent for energy costs in most cases, whereby customers see a single bill that includes charges for 
energy and network services.  Table 8 lists NSTAR’s regulated basic service rates, with an option for 
fixed semi-annual rates or variable monthly rates.  The energy rates are identical across all of NSTAR’s 
customer categories, indicating the separation between energy and network costs (not shown here).  
Distributed generators receive net-metered payments using one of the retail rates based on their 
customer category, as listed in the table. 
Table 8.  Basic Service Energy Rates for NSTAR Customers in the Cambridge Zone           
(c/kWh, 2010) 
Data Source: NSTAR (2009) 
 
 
To illustrate the relative magnitude of costs at the distribution level, NSTAR’s financial flows for a single 
year are analyzed, as shown in Figure 4.  About 50% of NSTAR’s annual expenses can be attributed to 
energy procurement.  In comparison, transmission and distribution network expenses are 6.2% and 4.5% 
respectively.  This indicates that network-related expenditure is a small fraction of NSTAR’s operations, 
even though it is a large distribution company.  
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Revenues
Residential  - $ 1.134 b 39%
C & I - $ 1.367 b 47%
Resale - $ 0.256 b 9%
Transmission for other
networks - $ 0.134 b 4.6%
$ 2.757 b      95%
Electricity Sales
$ 0.012 b 0.4%
$ 2.903 b    100%
Distribution Utility
(b illing agent)
Distribution $ 0.129 b 4.4%
Transmission  $ 0.181 b 6.2%
Power $ 1.461 b 50.3%
Customer Accounts &
Services           $ 0.120 b 4.1%
Administrative & 
General   $ 0.138 b    4.8%
$ 2.903 b    100%
Expenses
• Purchased power-$1.272b
• System Control &
Load Dispatching - $0.002b
• Other - $0.187 b
4.7%
50.3%
1.7%
74%
26%
7.0%
5.0%
Depreciation & 
Amortization     $ 0.145 b    5.0%
Regulatory $ 0.194 b 6.7%
Taxes     $ 0.225 b    7.8%
Net Operating Income
$ 0.310 b   10.7%
4.4%
5.3%
8.2%
10.7%
Other Sources
• Trans. by others - $0.144b
• System Control &
Load Dispatching - $0.012b
• Operations - $0.020 b
• Maintenance - $0.005 b
• System Control &
Load Dispatching - $0.008b
• Operations - $0.077 b
• Maintenance - $0.044 b
NSTAR Distribution Network Charges:
Components and Flows (2008)
  
Figure 4.  NSTAR Distribution Network Charges (2008) 
Data Source: NSTAR (2009) 
Although the examples used here are specific to NSTAR, the general tariff design is identical across 
investor-owned utilities in the state of Massachusetts and similar to utilities in other states in the New 
England region.  Some instances of differences in tariff structure are daily connection charges for Central 
Vermont Public Service in the state of Vermont, and seasonal time-of-use rates in the Central Maine 
Power Corporation in Maine, both states with agricultural customers and large rural tracts.  Such 
differences reflect the cost of network services at the distribution level in those states, based on their 
sparser concentration of residential and industrial customers.  However, in densely populated states such 
as Massachusetts and Connecticut, the distribution network costs are similar across different service 
territories.  Moreover, zonal network tariffs in these states that are specific to each zone within the same 
distribution utilities’ service area allow utilities to recover the costs of providing network services to 
customers specifically within the zone.  Thus, averaging of network related costs across large segments 
of the population is minimized, and the network tariffs are more cost-reflective to the user.   
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AUSTRALIA 
 
Network tariffs in Australia differ primarily by state, because the networks are organized primarily by state 
boundaries.  Within each state the network tariffs are differentiated by voltage level and time use.  Large 
customers in some parts of the country have nodal tariffs based on the capacity and length of their 
connection to a particular node in the network, because of large geographical distances that must be 
covered between generation and load centers.  Such demand length charges therefore influence the 
siting decisions of large customers.  Distribution network tariffs are usually average charges across 
voltage categories with time of use differentiation.  Distribution networks in Australia span larges 
geographical service areas, and the lack of geographical variation in tariffs within a state implies cross-
subsidization between customer groups, because it is more expensive to deliver network services to 
customers in rural areas than urban areas.  Distributed generators in Australia receive regulated rates for 
the net-metered electricity supplied to grid.  Additionally, they receive payments corresponding to the 
'avoided transmission use of system charges' which would have otherwise been paid to the transmission 
network.  This allows the transmission networks companies to recover their annual revenue requirements. 
 
1. SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS 
Australia’s electricity system is divided into three main sub-systems:  
• an interconnected system in eastern and southern Australia, known as the National Electricity 
Market (NEM) 
• the Western Australian system, further divided into  
o the Northwest Interconnected System (NWIS)  
o the Southwest Interconnected System (SWIS) 
o 29 regional, unconnected systems  
• the Northern Territory system (NTS) 
Figure 1 displays the relative location of the main sub-systems on the Australian landmass. The NEM 
operates in the world’s longest interconnected power system, from Port Douglas in Queensland to Port 
Lincoln in South Australia, a distance of around 5,000 kilometers or 3100 miles.  It includes the states of 
Queensland (Qld), New South Wales (NSW), Victoria (Vic), Southern Australia (SA), Tasmania (Tas) and 
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the Australian Capital Territory (ACT).  The Western Australian system operates within the borders of the 
state of Western Australia (WA), while the Northern Territory system is limited to the Northern Territory 
(NT). 
 
Figure 1.  Geographical Distribution of Electricity Networks in Australia 
Source: Australian Energy Regulator (AER) 2008 
The primary reason for the subdivisions is the geography of Australia, and the influence it has on 
Australian demographics and industry.  The industry and population centers in Western Australia are 
thousands of miles away from the NEM region.  Attempting to connect generation sources in the NEM to 
load centers in Western Australia or the Northern Territory would be expensive.  The main subsystems 
are therefore physically distinct and are not interconnected with each other.  Nonetheless, studying all the 
main sub-systems is useful because each provides examples of separate and different network tariff 
designs all within the same country.  Although the designs are similar in many respects, they are utilized 
in systems which have different network ownership, organization and regulatory structures.   The 
similarity in designs is evidence of the fact that tariff designs are independent of the characteristics of the 
system in some ways.  Postage-stamping for asset-independent network services such as ancillary 
services is one example of a similarity across all the Australian systems.  However, network tariffs are 
heavily influenced by the system organization in other ways.  This is found to be the case when network 
tariffs are unbundled from energy costs in systems with wholesale electricity markets and retail suppliers 
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as in the NEM. On the other hand, vertically integrated monopolies as in the Northern Territory offer 
bundled (integral) tariffs.  These distinctions affect the treatment of large and small customers, or small 
generators such as distributed generators.  Before exploring the tariff designs in detail, the general 
system characteristics of the main sub-systems in Australia will first be discussed.  
1.1 Generation 
Due to physical separation of the sub-systems, distinctions in ownership and regulatory structure are 
observed in the generation sectors of the sub-systems.  Australia has about 244 large electricity 
generators as shown in Figure 1, of which around 190 are in the National Electricity Market jurisdictions in 
eastern and southern Australia.  A number of smaller generators are connected at distribution voltage 
levels (embedded or distributed generators) and operate independent of the market.  Table 1 summarizes 
the generation profile of the various systems. 
Table 1.  Generation Sector Profile in Australia’s Electricity Systems 
Data Source:   Australian Energy Regulator, Economic Regulatory Authority,  
Northern Territories Utilities Commission (2009) 
Region NEM WA NT
Number of Customers 8,700,000              925,000                 82,000
Capacity (MW) 44,390                   6,117                     649                        
Fuel Source
Coal 66% 35%
Gas 15% 60% 0.9
Hydro 17%
Wind 1%
Other 1% 1%
Ownership / Control 
(% by capacity)
Government 67% 57% 73%
Private 33% 43% 27%
Structure Market Market (SWIS) Regulated
Regulated (NWIS)
4%
 
Generation in the NEM operates under the framework of a wholesale electricity market.  The NEM is a 
gross pool, in which all generators sell into the market through a central trading platform.  Retail suppliers, 
who are the primary customers, purchase electricity directly from the pool.  Bilateral contracts between 
generators and customers are prohibited.  The NEM also does not have provisions for capacity or 
availability payments where generators are paid to be available to supply electricity in periods of very high 
demand.  As a result, the NEM is an energy-only market.  Ancillary services in the NEM are procured 
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through ancillary services markets, similar to the wholesale market.  The existence of a wholesale market 
with a well-functioning retail sector implies that the network owners can recover the network-related costs 
independent of the energy transactions, although either the network company or the retail supplier might 
serve as the billing agent for both types of costs. 
Market and network operation in the NEM is the responsibility of the Australian Energy Market Operator 
(AEMO) under the provisions of the National Electricity Law.  It acts as the billing agent for the 
transactions involving wholesale supply, delivery and retail supply of electricity.  The AEMO also operates 
the ancillary services markets, and serves as the transmission planner for the NEM.  
A wholesale market was also established in the Southwest Interconnected System in 2006.  The market 
operates as a net pool, where generators and customers first enter into bilateral contracts, and the 
unsupplied demand is procured in the spot market.  The SWIS has provisions for capacity payments, 
unlike the NEM.  However, it has a retail sector as in the NEM, where Synergy is the primary retailer in 
the SWIS service area.  Synergy acts as the billing agent for both energy costs and network tariffs.  
The Northwest Interconnected System and Northern Territory system do not have a wholesale market 
because of their small generation capacities of only 400 MW and 650 MW respectively.  In the NWIS, 
electricity is procured from independent generators by the Horizon Power, the regional distributor, and 
supplied to customers.   
The Northern Territory has a bilateral contracting system where Power and Water, the monopoly 
generator, contracts directly with customers.  Six independent power producers that generate electricity 
for their own use also supply electricity to Power and Water under Power Purchase Agreements. 
The two types of organization in the generation sector (market and vertically integrated) and the existence 
of retail supply in some parts of the systems influences the network tariffs that customers see.  The main 
implication is architectural, i.e. the design is either an integral tariff or separate energy and network tariffs.  
1.2 Networks 
National Electricity Market 
The transmission networks in the NEM are organized primarily by state jurisdiction with interconnections 
between states that belong to the NEM network.  As the largest electricity system in Australia, the NEM 
also has the highest number of transmission networks.  Similarly, 13 of Australia’s 15 major distribution 
networks are located in the NEM. 
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Table 2.  Transmission Network Characteristics in Australia’s NEM 
Data Source: AER (2009), Note: 1 AUD = USD 0.924 = EUR 0.695 on May 1, 2010 
Network Location Owner Line Length Regulatory Structure
Regulated 
Asset 
Base 
Current 
Investment
(state) (km)
(2007 AUD 
millions)
(2007 AUD 
millions)
Transmission
   TransGrid NSW State Govt 12,489         Revenue Cap 3,013        1,184           
   Energy Australia NSW State Govt 1,040           Revenue Cap 636           230              
   SP AusNet Vic Joint Venture 6,500           Revenue Cap 2,191        947              
   Powerlink Qld State Govt 12,000         Revenue Cap 3,753        2,418           
   ElectraNet SA Joint Venture 5,611           Revenue Cap 1,251        655              
   Transend Tas State Govt 3,645           Revenue Cap 604           362              
Total 41,285         11,448      5,796           
Interconnectors
   Murraylink Vic-SA Private 180              Revenue Cap 103           -               
   Directlink Qld-NSW Private 63                Revenue Cap 117           -               
   Basslink Vic-Tas Private 375              Merchant 780           -               
Total 618              1,000        
 
  
Table 3.  Distribution Network Characteristics in Australia’s NEM 
Data Source: AER (2009) 
Network Location Owner Line Length Regulatory Structure
Regulated 
Asset 
Base 
Current 
Investment
(state) (km)
(2007 AUD 
millions)
(2007 AUD 
millions)
   EnergyAustralia NSW State Govt 47,144         Price Cap 4,116        2,455           
   Integral Energy NSW State Govt 33,863         Price Cap 2,283        1,733           
   Country Energy NSW State Govt 182,023       Price Cap 2,375        1,539           
   ActewAGL ACT Joint Venture 4,623           Revenue Cap 510           115              
   Solaris Vic Private 5,579           Price Cap 578           253              
   SPAusNet Vic Private 29,397         Price Cap 1,307        755              
   United Energy Vic Private 12,308         Price Cap 1,220        547              
   CitiPower Vic Private 6,488           Price Cap 991           529              
   Powercor Vic Private 80,577         Price Cap 1,626        1,008           
   ETSA Utilities SA Private 80,644         Revenue Yield 2,468        810              
   Energex Qld State Govt 48,115         Revenue Cap 4,308        3,011           
   Ergon Energy Qld State Govt 142,793       Revenue Cap 4,198        2,945           
   Aurora Energy Tas State Govt 24,400         Revenue Cap 981           575              
Total 697,954       26,961      16,275         
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Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of transmission systems in the NEM.  Transmission is 
concentrated along the eastern and southern coastline, reflecting the population density of those areas.  
The total length of all the transmission lines in the NEM regions is approximately 41,300 km (25,500 
miles).  Transmission networks are mostly state-owned, with a small share of private ownership.  The 
Basslink interconnection between New South Wales and Tasmania is currently the only transmission link 
that is merchant-owned.  The Australian Energy Regulator regulates all the transmission networks and 
interconnectors except Basslink, which is a merchant line.  The main transmission networks have a 
revenue cap review period of five years, whereas the regulated interconnectors have a period of 10 
years.   
Distribution networks in the NEM are government-owned in New South Wales, Queensland and 
Tasmania, and privately owned or leased in Victoria and South Australia. The ACT area has joint 
government and private ownership.  The total length of distribution lines in the NEM is approximately 
698,000 kilometers (434,000 miles).  Table 3 summarizes the characteristics of distribution systems in the 
NEM. 
The transmission and distribution networks are operated by the Australian Energy Market Operator 
(AEMO).  The AEMO is also the national transmission planning entity. 
The Regulated Asset Base (RAB) is the financial value of network assets that is used as a basis for 
determining the revenue requirements for network owners.  The combined RAB of all transmission 
networks in the NEM, including interconnectors is around AUD 12.4 billion, whereas the RAB for 
distribution networks is AUD 26.9 billion.  The Regulated Asset Base (RAB) for each network is 
determined at the beginning of the review period.  As a merchant line, Basslink does not have a RAB; 
however, its estimated construction cost is AUD 780 million.  The investment data for each network is the 
total investment over the complete review period, and includes incurred as well as forecast investments.  
Investments during a period are added into the RAB at the end of that period. 
Table 10 lists the forecast capital and operating expenses and the Annual Revenue Requirements (ARR) 
for Energex and Ergon, two of the largest distributors in the NEM.  Both are located in Queensland and 
are connected to the Powerlink transmission network.  The total revenues collected from all distribution 
customer categories must meet the ARR, which is approved by the Queensland Competition Authority as 
part of the five-year revenue cap process. 
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Figure 2.  Network Map of the National Electricity Market 
Source: Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO 2009) 
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Figure 3.  Distribution Network Service Areas in the NEM 
Source: AER 2009 
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Western Australia 
Both transmission and distribution networks in Western Australia are owned by Western Power, a state-
owned entity.  Western Power’s network characteristics are summarized in Table 4.   
Table 4.  Network Characteristics in Western Australia 
Data Source: Western Power, AER (2009) 
Network Location Owner Line Length Regulatory Structure
Regulated 
Asset 
Base 
Current 
Investment
(state) (km)
(2007 AUD 
millions)
(2007 AUD 
millions)
   WP Transmission WA State Govt 6,623           Revenue Cap 1,387        626              
   WP Distribution WA State Govt 69,083         Revenue Cap 1,595        907              
 
The Western Australian electricity system is sub-divided into the SWIS and NWIS, as shown in Figure 4.  
The SWIS is the major interconnected network in Western Australia with approximately 6,000 kilometers 
(3700 miles) of transmission lines and 64,000 kilometers (40,000 miles) of distribution lines (AER 2009).  
It serves Perth and other population centers in the southwest.  Western Power owns the transmission and 
distribution networks in the SWIS.  A ring-fenced entity within Western Power, System Management, is 
the system operator and controls generators, networks and load.  Electricity is procured from the net pool 
wholesale market by Synergy, the primary retail supplier.   
The NWIS is significantly smaller in size than the SWIS, because it serves only the industrial towns and 
mining centers in the northwest.  Horizon Power operates the networks and provides retail supply 
throughout the NWIS.  Electricity is procured from the privately-owned generators in the region.   
The 29 small unconnected distribution systems in Western Australia are located in rural and remote areas 
beyond the SWIS and NWIS.  These systems also serve industrial or mining townships and are operated 
by Horizon Energy. 
Western Power’s RAB for transmission is approximately AUD 2 billion, and approximately AUD 2.5 billion 
for distribution networks.  Networks are regulated under a revenue cap with a 2 year review period for 
transmission and 3 year period for distribution.   
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Figure 4.  Network Map of Western Australia (ERA 2009) 
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Figure 5.  Network Map of  the Northern Territory  
Source: AER 2009 
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Northern Territory 
The transmission and distribution networks in the Northern Territory are owned and operated by a Power 
and Water Corporation, a state-owned company.  Power and Water is also the sole generator and retail 
supplier (Figure 5).     
Table 5.  Network Characteristics in the Northern Territory 
Data Source: Western Power, AER (2009) 
Network Location Owner Line Length Regulatory Structure
Regulated 
Asset 
Base 
Current 
Investment
(state) (km)
(2007 AUD 
millions)
(2007 AUD 
millions)
  Power and Water NT State Govt 6,619           Revenue Cap 432           -               
 
Power and Water’s total RAB for both its transmission and distribution network is approximately AUD 430 
million.  The networks are regulated under a revenue cap with a five year review period.  Power and 
Water’s vertically integrated structure implies that customers see an integral tariff that includes both 
energy and network costs. 
 
2. TARIFFS 
The three electricity sub-systems in Australia have many similarities and some differences in tariff design 
as described below. 
2.1 National Electricity Market 
The 13 distribution systems in the six states of the NEM are connected to the transmission network of 
each state and are regulated according to the National Electricity Rules as well as the state guidelines.  
Ergon Energy’s (Queensland) tariff design is used as an example of the 13 distribution companies in the 
NEM, because Ergon is one of the largest distributors in terms of both line length and Regulated Asset 
Base.  Ergon’s tariffs are approved by the Queensland Competition Authority (QCA) to ensure 
compliance with Queensland Electricity Industry Code and the National Electricity Rules.  As a Supplier of 
Last Resort (SoLR), Ergon also provides retail services to many customers in Queensland.  The design 
described in this section is for network access tariffs and does not include retail pricing schemes.  
However, the design also applies to retailers as customers procuring electricity on behalf of end-users.  
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Transmission costs from Powerlink, Queensland’s transmission company are included as a pass through 
in this design. 
Table 6.  Network Tariff Design in the NEM 
Data Source: Ergon Energy, Queensland Competition Authority (2009) 
Cost Components Customer Type Cost Allocation Rate Structure Variations
(by consumption)
Very Large Dedicated Fixed daily ($/day)
Large Dedicated Fixed daily ($/day)
Small Average by voltage category Fixed daily ($/day)
Distributed Generator Dedicated Fixed daily ($/day)
Very Large Zonal, proportional to use
Monthly capacity or 
actual demand 
($/kW/month) and 
volume ($/kWh)
Large Zonal, average by voltage category
Monthly capacity or 
actual demand 
($/kW/month) and 
volume ($/kWh)
Peak/off-peak
Small Zonal, average by voltage category
Monthly capacity or 
actual demand 
($/kW/month) and 
volume ($/kWh)
Peak/off-peak
Distributed Generator Only if consuming; by size as above Only if consuming; by 
size as aboove
Very Large Locational by connection point, postage stamp
Monthly capacity 
($/kW/month), fixed 
daily ($/day), daily 
service charge ($/day) 
and volume ($/kWh)
Large Locational by connection point, postage stamp
Monthly capacity 
($/kW/month), fixed 
daily ($/day), daily 
service charge ($/day) 
and volume ($/kWh)
Small Locational by connection point, postage stamp
Monthly demand 
($/kW/month) and/or 
fixed daily ($/day) and 
volume ($/kWh)
Generator Locational, postage stamp Daily capacity ($/kW/day)
Commercial 
Services
Meter installations and 
reading;  billing 
services
All Average partially weighted by 
consumption
Fixed daily ($/day) and 
volume ($/kWh)
Energy Policy Renewable Energy All Surcharge
Fixed ($/year); 
increasing by 
consumption blocks
Connection assets; 
Network reinforcement
Shared network use; 
Common services like 
system control; 
Administrative costs of 
network operation
Connection 
Charges
Distribution 
UoS Charges
Transmission 
UoS Charges
Shared network use; 
Common services like 
ancillary services; 
Administrative costs of 
network operation
NEM (Ergon Energy)
 
Connection charges in the NEM are recovered as deep charges, where dedicated connection equipment 
and some or all of the reinforcement costs are recovered from the connecting network user.  All network 
users, except small customers, pay deep connection charges.  Small users pay an average connection 
charge.  Charges are in the form of a fixed daily charge ($/day) for each day that a user is connected to 
the network over the billing cycle.  When network reinforcements or expansion paid for by previous 
network users benefits subsequent customers, the new customers may be required to pay for 
reimbursements to the original users through the connection charge.  This provision is limited to new 
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users connecting within five years of the date of connection of the first user in a particular area of the 
network. 
Distribution Use-of-System charges in the NEM vary by customer type.  Very large customers are 
charged for network assets dedicated for their use in the form of a capacity charge ($/kW).  Large 
customers are charged by capacity ($/kW) in proportion to their use of shared system assets at their 
voltage level.  Small customers are charged for the average use of assets for their voltage category, 
either in the form of a monthly demand charge ($/kW/month) at higher voltage levels, or only by volume of 
energy consumed ($/kWh) at lower voltage levels. 
Transmission Use-of-System charges are levied on distribution networks as transmission customers 
procuring transmission network services.  Transmission network costs are allocated to locations or zones 
in the transmission network.  Users connecting to connection points in a zone pay charges for network 
use that is specific to that zone.  Some general or common transmission costs such as ancillary services 
that are not asset-related are recovered from all network customers on a postage stamp basis. 
Transmission UoS charges are subsequently allocated and passed through to distribution network users. 
Table 7 lists selected tariff schemes from Ergon Energy’s network tariffs to illustrate the charge structure 
for most small customers and the lower number of large customers.  The schemes shown below are 
consistent with the tariff design described in Table 6.  Transmission Use of System charges calculated 
based on the zonal allocation are passed through wherever applicable. 
Apart from paying for the dedicated connection assets and network reinforcements, distributed generators 
are charged for network use only when they act as a load.  Generators that do not draw electricity from 
the network do not pay for use of the distribution network.  If they do draw electricity at any time, they are 
charged according to their consumption size as described above.  For example, a manufacturing facility 
with solar installations may supply its surplus electricity to the grid at some times of the year, and draw 
electricity at others.  It will be treated as a consumer at those times, and be responsible for charges 
appropriate to its size and network use. 
Transmission UoS charges do not apply to distributed generators for the periods when they are supplying 
electricity to the grid.  In fact, distributed generators are paid an amount corresponding to the avoided 
transmission Use-of-System charge.  The distributor, Ergon, calculates the transmission UoS charges 
that the distribution company would have paid to the transmission system, had the distributed generator 
not supplied any energy at its connection point.  The difference between the calculated amount and the 
distribution network’s actual payments to the transmission system is defined as the avoided transmission 
UoS charge.  The amount corresponding to the avoided charge is not considered part of the distribution 
network’s revenue requirement and is recovered through the transmission UoS component from 
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customers connected to the same connection point as the distributed generator.  The amount is paid to 
the distributed generator instead of the transmission network. 
Table 7.  Selected Network Tariff Schedules for Ergon Energy 
Data Source: Ergon Energy, Queensland Competition Authority (2009), Note: Values in AUD 
 
Table 8.  Queensland Net-Metering Rate Schedule for Ergon Energy 
Data Source: Ergon Energy, Queensland Competition Authority (2009), Note: Values in AUD 
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In addition to the avoided transmission Use-of-System charge, solar generators connected to Ergon’s 
network are eligible for net metering, as shown in Table 8.  If such generators supply surplus electricity 
back to grid, they receive 44 c/kWh under the Queensland solar bonus scheme.  This rate is significantly 
higher than the Use of System charges paid by such customer.  Solar distributed generators in 
Queensland therefore have an incentive to connect and supply electricity to the grid through the two 
mechanisms of avoided charges and net metered payments.   
Costs of commercial services such as meter reading and billing are not allocated to specific customer 
types but recovered from all customers using the service.  Customers pay a fixed daily charge ($/day) 
which is an average cost across all customers, weighted by their consumption. 
The cost of electricity procured by the distribution company is passed through consumers through the 
energy charge ($/kWh).  Customers can choose to obtain their electricity from renewable sources by 
paying a fixed surcharge ($/year) to allow the distribution company to recover the surplus cost of more 
expensive electricity. 
Table 9.  Selected Retail tariffs for Ergon Energy 
Data Source: Ergon Energy, Queensland Competition Authority (2009), Note: Values in AUD 
Fixed Supply Charges
Tariff ($/month minimum)
Domestic (T11) 7.25
Domestic Night-rate (T31) 5.05
Domestic Controlled Supply (T33) 5.05
Rural/C&I (T20) 13.15
First 100 
kWh/month
Next 9,900 
kW h/month Excess
General (T21) 11.75 26.24 24.64 18.76
Peak Off-peak Weekend
General Supply (T22) 28.95 25.66 9.04 9.04
Peak Off-peak Demand
($/month minimum) ($/kw)
General Demand (T43) 44.32 13.31 5.32 13.46
Differentiated Rate (time of use)
(c/kWh)
Differentiated Rate (demand time of use)
(c/kWh)
18.84
7.69
11.32
21.12
Energy Charges
Single Rate
Differentiated Rate (consumption)
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Table 9 lists some selected retail tariffs from Ergon Energy that are illustrative of the cost pass through 
end use customers.  The fixed supply charges include network connection costs as well as metering and 
administrative expenses for Ergon.  For most customers, Ergon is the distributor as well as the retailer 
and therefore acts as the billing agent.  The retail tariffs are much higher than the network tariffs shown in 
Table 7, because they include the energy costs and other retail expenses.  The retail tariffs are seen as 
integrated tariffs from the point of view of the end use customer.  As the retail tariffs are identical for all 
customers in the Ergon service are, the locational signals observed in the distribution and transmission 
Use of System charges are lost through averaging. 
 
2.2 Western Australia 
The tariff design for Western Power’s network service in Western Australia is similar to the tariff designs 
in the NEM, with a few important differences in cost allocation, capacity and demand charge calculations 
(kVA versus kW).  Connection charge design for network users is identical to that in the NEM, except for 
distributed generators.  In Western Australia, such generators pay a daily charge that is proportional to 
the capacity of their connection. The charge structure for commercial services in ($/day) and ($/kWh) are 
similar to those in the NEM.  The network tariff designs for different user groups are summarized in Table 
10. 
Table 11 lists the network tariff charges for some customer categories to illustrate the quantitative range 
and scale of the tariffs.  This is not an exhaustive list of all tariff categories, but is still representative of the 
architectural elements described in Table 10. 
Distribution Use-of-System charges are similar to those in the NEM in terms of cost allocation.  Users pay 
average charges that reflect the zonal cost of delivering electricity to that zone.  This is indicated by the 
fixed supply charge that is identical over a number of categories.  Both small and large users can choose 
a tariff that has provisions for peak and off-peak prices, allowing them to manage their period of 
consumption.  The transmission Use of System charges are allocated in the form of energy prices by 
volume (c/kWh) and do not have a fixed costs component for the listed tariff categories.  However, there 
are some daily connection charges and charges for common services based on the connection capacity 
(c/kW/day), which are discussed below. 
Large and very large users also pay demand charges for daily metered demand ($/kVA/day) and daily 
demand length (($/kVA.km/day) which reflect the cost of assets dedicated for their use (Table 12).  The 
value used to calculate the metered demand or demand length charge is the peak value in a rolling 12-
month period.  Thus, large users can lower their demand charges by lowering peak demand.  
Additionally, such users receive a discount for consuming electricity during off-peak periods, based on the 
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ratio of total off-peak to peak consumption during the billing cycle.   Demand length charges provide 
network users an incentive to locate closer to the zonal substation or point of connection to the 
transmission network. 
Table 10.  Network Tariff Design in Western Australia 
Data Source: Western Power, Economic Regulatory Authority (2009) 
Cost Components Customer Type Cost Allocation Rate Structure Variations
(by consumption)
Very Large Dedicated Fixed daily  ($/day) -
Large Dedicated Fixed daily  ($/day) -
Small Average Fixed daily  ($/day) -
Distributed Generator Dedicated Daily capacity ($/kW/day) -
Very Large Zonal
Daily capacity 
($/kVA/day) and / or 
daily demand length 
($/kVA.km/day)
-
Large Zonal
Volume ($/kWh) or daily 
metered demand 
($/kVA/day)
Peak / Off-peak w/ 
discount for off-
peak use
Small Zonal Volume ($/kWh) Peak / Off-peak
Distributed Generator Zonal Daily capacity ($/kW/day) -
Very Large Locational
Daily capacity 
($/kVA/day) and / or 
daily demand length 
($/kVA.km/day)
Large Locational
Volume ($/kWh) or daily 
metered demand 
($/kVA/day) and / or 
daily demand length 
($/kVA.km/day)
Peak / Off-peak
Small Locational Volume ($/kWh) Peak / Off-peak
Generator Locational Daily capacity ($/kW/day)
Commercial 
Services
Meter installations and 
reading;  billing 
services
All Average Fixed daily ($/day) and 
volume ($/kWh) Peak / Off-peak
Energy Policy Renewable Energy All Surcharge
Fixed ($/year); 
increasing by 
consumption blocks
Western Australia (Western Power / Horizon Power)
Connection 
Charges
Connection assets; 
Network reinforcement
Distribution 
UoS Charges
Shared network use; 
Common services like 
system control; 
Administrative costs of 
network operation
Transmission 
UoS Charges
Shared network use; 
Common services like 
ancillary services; 
Administrative costs of 
network operation
 
Demand charges are calculated in the units of kVA, instead of kW, to allow users to manage their power 
factor.  The effective demand for a power rating in kVA with a power factor lower than unity is higher than 
the same power rating expressed in kW.  A user can lower effective demand by bringing the power factor 
close to unity.  Large or very larges users can also choose a tariff with contract maximum demand for the 
billing cycle and pay the corresponding ($/kVA) charge.  If users exceed their contracted demand, they 
pay a monthly penalty for the month in which demand was exceeded.  The penalty provides customers 
with the incentive to manage their own demand below the contracted maximum.  Additionally, it reduces 
the uncertainty of whether network expansion is necessary, and also keeps the expansion to a minimum. 
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Table 11.  Selected Network Tariff Categories of Western Power (2009-10)                          
Data Source: Western Power, Economic Regulatory Authority (2009), Note: Values in AUD 
Fixed Price
(c/day)
Single Rate Peak Off-peak
Transmission -               1.36           - -
Distribution 23.29           3.08           - -
Total 23.29           4.44           - -
Transmission -               1.63           - -
Distribution 23.29           4.35           - -
Total 23.29           5.98           - -
Transmission -               - 2.53        0.53        
Distribution 23.29           - 4.94        1.14        
Total 23.29           - 7.47        1.68        
Transmission -               - 2.08        0.50        
Distribution 29.19           - 4.50        1.03        
Total 29.19           - 6.59        1.53        
Large Time of Use 
(RT4)
Energy Rates
(c/kWh)
Anytime 
Residential (RT1)
Anytime Business 
(RT2)
Small Time of Use 
(RT3)
 
Table 12.  Example of Demand-Length Tariffs for Large Western Power Customers          
(2009 AUD) 
Data Source: Western Power, Economic Regulatory Authority (2009) 
 
Transmission UoS charges are nodal and use the locational price for delivering electricity at a particular 
node, based on the user’s contract maximum demand.  The transmission charges for users connected to 
the distribution network are passed through in the cost allocation for use of the distribution network as 
shown above. 
Distributed generators are treated as large-scale generators connected at the transmission level.  They 
pay a ($/kW) charge for network use based on their declared generation capacity.  The charge is 
calculated by using the transmission nodal price at the nearest transmission connection point.  Such 
generators are not responsible for common or shared services that do not reflect asset-related costs.  
However, they also pay dedicated connection charges based on the capacity of their connection 
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($/kW/day).  This treatment of distributed generators ensures that all generators in the Western Australian 
network are subject to the same requirements.  However, the network tariff rates for distributed 
generators are much higher than for generators connected to the transmission level, because the tariffs 
include costs for the lower voltage levels of the network.  On the other hand, the network tariffs line item 
in the bill could be low in magnitude because of the small generation capacity of distributed generators.  
Ultimately, such generators will have an incentive to operate if their revenues from total energy sold 
($/kWh) are higher than the sum of their network costs ($/kW and $/kW/day) and other operating costs. 
Table 14 provides an exhaustive list of forecast revenues from all of Western Power’s customer 
categories for 2009-2010.  These figures represent Western Power’s total revenue requirement, which 
includes its network-related costs and return on capital.  As expected, revenues from the flat-rate 
residential category are the largest contribution for both transmission (AUD 69 M) and distribution (AUD 
273 M) because of the large number of small residential customers.  The contribution of high voltage 
contract customers (AUD 42 M) is a large component of revenues at the transmission level in addition to 
revenues from generators (AUD 47 M).  Business customers appear to subscribe significantly to both flat-
rate as well as time of use tariffs.  As described above, demand management incentives for customers in 
these tariff categories can influence network use and the corresponding costs and revenues.  Distributed 
generators do not contribute to tariff category RT11, because such generators are treated as high-voltage 
generators in the Western Australian network.  Their revenues are therefore included in tariff category 
TRT2. 
Table 15 shows a list of retail tariffs as provided by the retail supplier Synergy for some selected customer 
categories corresponding to those in Table 12.  These retail tariffs include connection charges, use of 
system charges, energy costs and renewable energy surcharges such as Renewable Energy Credits 
(RECs).  The tariffs shown here do not include one-time fees and administrative charges for reconnecting 
or disconnecting meters, commercial transactions, etc.  Such administrative and commercial charges 
appear as separate line items on the customer’s bill.  The charges include a 10% Goods and Services 
Tax (GST). 
By comparing Table 15 and 11, it is easy to observe that the retail fixed supply charges (c/day) are higher 
than the total fixed supply charges in the network tariffs.  The difference can be attributed to the costs of 
retail supply which are over and above the network tariffs being charged by Western Power.  It is more 
difficult to compare the retail energy charges and the Use of System charges because the retail charges 
include energy costs, and represent a significant amount of averaging so that all customers across 
Synergy’s service area in the SWIS see the same retail tariffs.  The observations are similar with Horizon 
Power’s retail tariffs in the NWIS part of Western Australia. 
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Table 13.  Partial List of Nodal Transmission Use of System Tariffs (2009 AUD) 
Data Source: Western Power, Economic Regulatory Authority (2009) 
Substation Node
Identification
Albany WALB
Alcoa Pinjarra WAPJ
Amherst WAMT
Boulder WBLD
Bounty WBNY
Bridgetown WBTN
. .
. .
. .
Yerbillon WYER
Yilgarn WYLN
Yokine WYKE
11.8                           
4.9                             
.
.
.
20.7                           
3.4                             
14.0                           
35.2                           
7.3                             
Use of System Price
13.0                           
(c/kW/day)
5.8                             
 
 
Table 14.  Forecast Western Power Network Revenue Requirements (2009-10)                   
(2009 AUD Millions) 
Data Source: Western Power, Economic Regulatory Authority (2009) 
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Table 15.  Synergy Retail Tariffs in the SWIS-Western Australia (2009-10)  (2009 AUD) 
Data Source: Western Power, Economic Regulatory Authority (2009) 
Tariff Type
Supply 
Charge
(c/day)
Residential Flat Rate (A1) 32.33
Off-peak Residential Water 
Heating (B1) 18.46
First 20 kWh/day 21 - 1650 kWh/day More than 1650 kWh/day
Home Business Tariff (K1) 32.33 17.61 22.08 19.93
More than 1650 kWh/day
Business Plan (L1) 
(low/medium voltage 240/415 
volts; < 50 MWh/yr) 30.68 18.19
Large Business (M1) (high 
voltage 6.6-33 kV; > 50 
MWh/yr) 32.14 18.33
($/day)
Peak Off-peak Weekend
Business Time of Use (R1) 
(low/medium/high voltage 240 
V - 33 kV; < 50 MWh/yr) 126 22.08 6.81 6.81
Peak Off-peak Demand
($/day) (c/kW/day)
Large Business Demand (S1) 
(low/medium voltage 240/415 
V) >=335.36 12.19 7.71 85.18
Large Business Demand (T1) 
(high voltage 6.6-33 kV) >=442.42 11.4 7.58 77.95
Energy Charge
(c/kWh)
20.16
First 1650 kWh/day
Single Rate
Differentiated Rate (consumption)
17.61
7.1
20.41
Differentiated Rate (time of use)
(c/kWh)
(c/kWh)
 
 
2.3 Northern Territories 
The electricity tariffs in the Northern Territories are integrated, bundled tariffs reflecting Power and Water 
Corporation’s status as a vertically integrated monopoly generation and network services company.  The 
Utilities Commission of the Northern Territory has reasoned that the small number of customers in NT 
does not warrant an unbundling of tariffs.  Table 16 indicates the tariff design employed by Power and 
Water. 
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Table 16.  Network Tariff Design in the Northern Territories 
Data Source: Power and Water, NT Utilities Commission (2009) 
Cost Components Customer Type Cost Allocation Rate Structure Variations
(by consumption)
Large customers only Average by demand voltage level Monthly capacity ($/kVA/month) Peak / off-peak
Small customers only Average Included in fixed 
connection charge -
Large customers only Consumption Volume ($/kWh) Peak / off-peak
Small customers only Consumption Volume ($/kWh) -
Connection assets, 
metering, 
administrative and 
commercial service 
Shared transmission 
and distribution 
network usage, 
network control, 
ancillary and other 
common services
Average Fixed monthly ($/month) -
Average Fixed daily  ($/day) -
Energy
Integrated 
Bundled Tariff
Large
Small
 
Large and small customers pay a fixed monthly ($/month) and daily ($/day) charge respectively based on 
the average cost of connection assets, meters, meter reading and other administrative and commercial 
services. 
Large customers are charged for shared network usage in the form of a monthly demand charge 
($/kVA/month) which varies by peak and off-peak usage.  Charges for demand decrease by increasing 
demand blocks.  Small customers do not have demand charges.  The demand charges act as an 
incentive for large customers to minimize their maximum demand.  Small customers do not have such an 
incentive.  By minimizing overall demand for each connection, network costs can be reduced through 
limited network expansion and smaller connection capacities. 
Both large and small customers have an energy charge measured by consumption volume ($/kWh), with 
peak / off-peak energy prices for large customers.  Time of use pricing is not available to small customers.  
Large consumers can reduce their energy costs by consuming during off-peak periods when it is cheaper 
to produce and supply electricity.  Decreasing block rates with increasing consumption have a negative 
incentive where customers can consume more at lower marginal costs of consumption. 
 No special arrangements are observed for renewable energy or distributed generation in the Northern 
Territory system.  It therefore closely resembles traditional vertically integrated electricity systems in many 
parts of the world.  In late 2009, a Full Retail Contestability (FRC) public consultation was conducted to 
evaluate the potential and scope of retail competition in the Northern Territories electricity system.  
However, the study committee concluded that the potential benefits of retail competition in the system are 
very small in the absence of significant restructuring of the system and reorganization of Power and 
Water Corp’s asset network and generation assets.  Pending further actions by the Northern territories 
legislature and the Utilities Commission, the tariffs in this system will therefore continue to be integral 
tariffs.  
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Table 17 describes the final integral tariff applicable to the “Northern Grid” sub-division in Northern 
Territories.  Similar tariffs are applied in the “Alice Springs” and “Tennant Creek” sub-divisions. 
Table 17.  Integral Tariff for the Northern Grid Sub-division (2009-10) (AUD 2009) 
Data Source: Power and Water, NT Utilities Commission (2009) 
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PORTUGAL 
 
Portuguese customers pay access tariffs that are comprised of both network and energy policy costs.  
The access tariffs are uniform across the entire country, with differentiations by voltage levels and time of 
use.  The high degree of voltage and time of use differentiation allows the access tariffs to reflect the cost 
of providing network service to individual customers at their respective voltage level and times of use.  
However, the lack of geographical variation in tariffs distorts the cost allocation to various network users. 
Most customers in Portugal are on a Tariff of Last Resort, a regulated integral tariff.  This arrangement is 
a policy choice that allows small customers, both residential and business, access to electricity at fixed 
prices.  Medium and large customers can contract with retail suppliers for contract or negotiated rates.  
Regulated integral tariffs have resulted in under recovery of revenue requirements in recent years due to 
unexpectedly high energy costs and large payments to renewables and distributed generators.  Such 
generators receive subsidies for network use through the Special Regime mechanism, in effect raising 
network related costs for end-use customers. 
 
1. SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS 
The Potuguese electricity system is characterized by a high degree of restructuring.  The wholesale 
market, transmission and distribution networks, and retail electricity supply are managed independently 
by legally separate entities.   
1.1 Generation 
The generation sector of the Portuguese electricity system operates under a wholesale market 
framework.  The wholesale market is jointly managed with Spain as the Iberian Electricity Market 
(MIBEL).  Daily and intra-daily transactions are managed by the Spanish partner, Operador do Mercado 
Ibérico de Energia - Pólo Español, S.A. (OMEL).  The Portuguese partner, Operador do Mercado Ibérico 
de Energia - Pólo Português, S.A. (OMIP), manages the energy derivatives market.  The MIBEL, or its 
individual operators OMEL and OMIP, do not own any generating capacity.  Generators are primarily 
owned by independent power producers (IPPs) and distributed generators. 
OMEL is the dispatcher and the billing agent for settlements between various market participants such as 
IPPs, Special Regime generators, distribution companies and retailers.  Bilateral contracts between 
generators and customers are permitted, with any imbalances purchased in the spot market.  The market 
is therefore a net pool.  The spot market has day-ahead and real-time segments.   
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Figure 1.  Portuguese Electricity System  
Data Source: REN (2008) 
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The principal method of contracting electricity in Portugal is through transactions in the day-ahead 
market, which accounts for 85% of the energy contracted by volume.  The balance is procured through 
long-term bilateral contracts (8%) and the intra-daily market (7%).  EDP Serviço Universal, the largest retail 
supplier of electricity and the Provider of Last Resort, is the largest wholesale market customer and 
purchases about 98% of the electricity by volume.  The costs of market operation are paid by all 
consumers connected to the electricity network in the form of dues included in the access tariffs.   
The joint Iberian market facilitates the cross-border trade of electricity between the Portugal and Spain.  It 
also has provisions for market splitting during peak hours when congestion conditions are experienced 
across the interconnections and during emergencies.  An explicit market splitting fee is included in the 
access tariffs to pay for this service. 
During the restructuring process most long-term power purchase agreements were ended to allow for the 
creation of the wholesale electricity market.  However, two such agreements with the largest generators in 
Portugal, the Pego coal plant and the Turbogas combined cycle gas plant were preserved.  A separate 
regulated entity, the Redes Energéticas Nacionais (REN) Trading Group manages these contracts.  It 
also participates in the trading of energy securities in the OMIP and manages Portuguese emissions 
trading activities in the European emissions market.  The revenue requirements for REN Trading and the 
stranded costs of the old power purchase agreements are recovered through the access tariffs. 
REN Trading also procures ancillary services such as reserves, black start capability and voltage and 
frequency regulation through the MIBEL.  The cost of ancillary services is included in the access tariffs to 
customers.   
Table 1 displays the generation sector profile in Portugal.  The generation capacity is divided into two 
categories: Ordinary Regime (70%) and Special Regime (30%).  Large-scale hydroelectric plants 
represent the largest share of total generation capacity (30%), followed by wind (17.6%) and natural gas 
(14.5%).  About 85% of the Ordinary Regime generation capacity is owned by EDP Produçāo, a 
subsidiary of the Energias de Portugal Group.  Large-scale renewable generators and distributed 
generators are subject to the Special Regime, which comprises 30% of the total generating capacity.  
These generators receive special tariffs and premiums.  
The Special Regime (PRE) is a mechanism to enable the achievement of targets for the penetration of 
renewable generation technologies and combined heat and power (CHP) applications in the Portuguese 
electricity system.  The main characteristic of the PRE is the provision of financial premiums to certain 
generation technologies, as an incentive to enter the market and deliver electricity at desired levels of 
reliability and quality. 
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Table 1.  Generation Sector Profile in Portugal (2008) 
Data Source:   ERSE, REN (2009) 
Fuel Source
Nameplate 
Capacity Percentage Capacity
(MW)
Ordinary Regime
Hydroelectric 4,578                  30.7%
Coal 1,776                  11.9%
Fuel-oil 1,476                  9.9%
Fuel-oil / natural gas 236                     1.6%
Gas-oil 165                     1.1%
Natural gas 2,166                  14.5%
Sub-total 10,397                69.7%
Special Regime
Small hydroelectric 379                     2.5%
Thermal 1,463                  9.8%
Wind 2,624                  17.6%
Photovoltaic 50                       0.3%
W ave 2                         0.0%
Sub-total 4,518                  30.3%
Total 14,915                100%
 
The primary technology categories included in the Regime and their respective tariffs are listed in Table 
2.  Many PRE generators connect to the network at distribution voltage-levels as distributed generators, 
due to their small generating capacity.  The distribution system operator is required to enter into 
connection agreements with qualifying generators, pursuant to specific technical and operating 
requirements.  Some larger facilities are eligible to connect directly to the transmission network.  PRE 
generators are entitled to transfer all of the electricity generated to the network, net of their consumption.  
These generators also enjoy priority of access and connection to the grid.  That is, PRE generators are 
connected to the grid before other generators in the queue, and any net transfer by such generators must 
be accepted before other generators in that region of the network are dispatched.  When these 
generators have fulfilled the technical and operating requirements as specified in their connection 
agreements with network companies, they receive the appropriate regulated tariff or the wholesale market 
price, and a premium in some cases.  PRE generators can also sell electricity to consumers through a 
direct connection and bilateral contracts, and are not required to sell to the grid or in the wholesale 
market.  Costs corresponding to PRE payments are recovered from all consumers connected to the 
network through access tariffs.  As Figure 2 indicates, the average cost of electricity from PRE generators 
has been significantly higher than average costs of energy acquired from the ordinary regime generators. 
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Table 2.  Description and Reference Tariffs of the Special Regime for Generation 
Data Source: Portuguese Director General of Energy and Geology (2009) 
Technology Reference Rate Terms
(€/MWh)
W ind 74 - 75 33 GW h/MW or 15 years
Hydro (< 10 MW) 75 - 77 52 GWh/MW or 20 years, in 
some cases 25 years
Photovoltaic (> 5 kW) 310 - 317
Photovoltaic (<= 5 kW) 450
Solar Thermal (<= 10 MW) 267 - 273
PV Microgeneration (<= 5 kW) 470
PV Microgeneration (> 5 kW and 
<= 150 kW) 355
Biomass 102 - 109 25 years
Biogass 102 - 117 15 years
Agricultural waste 53 - 76 15 years
W aves (< 4 MW) 260 15 years
W aves (< 20 MW) 191 15 years
W aves (>=100 MW) 131 15 years
21 GWh/MW or 15 years
15 years
 
 
Figure 2.  Average Wholesale Electricity Costs in Portugal (2000-2008) 
Source: ERSE (2009) 
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1.2 Networks 
The transmission network in Portugal is owned and operated as a single national network.  Distribution 
networks are owned by more than one entity but operated by one distribution operator.  Both networks 
are regulated by the Portuguese energy regulator, Entidade Reguladora Dos Serviços Energéticos 
(ERSE). 
Redes Energéticas Nacional, SA (REN) is the national transmission system operator (TSO).  It has 
exclusive concessionary rights to own and operate the transmission system until 2057.  The holding 
company Redes Energéticas Nacionais SGPS owns 100% of REN along with the national natural gas 
transmission system, telecommunication assets, and the REN Trading Corporation.  Approximately 50% 
of the holding company is owned by the Portuguese state, while 30% is owned by other large state-
owned and private corporations including RED Eléctrica and EDP Group.  Small shareholders own the 
remaining 20% of the REN Group.  
Table 3.  Transmission Line Lengths and Investments (2005 – 2008) 
Data Source: REN, ERSE (2009) 
2005 2006 2007 2008
Voltage
(kV)
400 1,500         1,507         1,588         1,589         
220 2,875         3,080         3,177         3,257         
150 2,282         2,431         2,661         2,667         
Total 6,657         7,018         7,426         7,513         
Total 172,583     209,370     222,471     236,403     
(km)
Line Lengths
Investments
(thousand €)
 
The transmission line lengths and investments in the network for the period 2005 – 2008 are summarized 
in Table 3.  In 2008, Portugal’s national transmission system consisted of approximately 7,500 km of 
transmission lines.  The density of 220 kV lines is high around the main load centers of Lisbon and Porto.  
Most 400 kV transmission lines run North-South along the coast, with some East-West interconnections 
to Spain.  Figure 3 depicts the transmission interconnections of varying capacities between Portugal and 
Spain.  The regulated asset base of the Portuguese transmission network was estimated at € 1.67 billion 
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in 2008.  REN’s annual revenue requirements are set by ERSE, and recovered through the access tariffs, 
as shown in Table 5. 
 
Figure 3.  Transmission Interconnections to Spain 
Source: RED Eléctrica (2009) 
Table 4.  Distribution Line Lengths and Investments (2005 – 2008) 
Data Source: EDP, ERSE (2009) 
2005 2006 2007 2008
Voltage
(kV)
60 kV 7,362         7,877         8,047         8,373         
10 - 30 55,240       56,121       56,965       57,700       
< 10 100,380     101,537     102,474     103,248     
Total 162,982     165,535     167,486     169,321     
Total 332,355     282,943     239,812     242,574     
Line Lengths
(km)
Investments
(thousand €)
 
REN plans to invest approximately € 1.8 billion during the period 2009 to 2014 for grid reinforcements 
(18%), network expansion (29%), interconnection capacity augmentation (12%), new customer 
connections (12%), new distributed generation connections (12%), large-scale generator connections 
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(13%), and supporting equipment (4%).  Once the investments have been approved by ERSE, the 
investments are added to the rate base and REN recovers the cost of new investments through the 
annual revenue requirements.  Thus, there exists a due process for new transmission investments and 
allocation and recovery is not an issue once new investments have been approved.  The decision of 
investment approval is left to ERSE. 
The distribution networks in Portugal are owned by a large network company and some small electricity 
cooperatives.  EDP Distribuição, a subsidiary of the EDP Group, owns approximately 99% of the national 
distribution network, and therefore serves as the Distribution System Operator (DSO).  The other owners 
are required to sign agreements with the DSO, allowing it to manage and operate their networks.  The 
distribution network line lengths and investments undertaken by EDP Distribuição for the period 2005 – 
2008 are summarized in Table 4.  The DSO’s annual revenue requirements are set by ERSE, and 
recovered through the access tariffs as shown in Table 5.   
Table 5.  Annual Revenue Requirements (ARR) for Regulated Electricity Companies (2010) 
Data Source: EDP, REN, ERSE (2009) 
 
REN Trading 248,060                           
Energy Procurement 248,060                           
REN 803,574                           
Global System Management 543,626                           
Transmission costs 259,948                           
EDP Distribuição 2,573,875                        
Distribution costs 1,245,404                        
Transmission access 1,328,471                        
EDP Serviço Universal 4,001,219                        
Premiums to Special Regime 805,123                           
Regular purchases 949,423                           
  Transmission and distribution access 2,145,826                        
Commercial services 100,847                           
Energy and network services in Azores 170,626                           
Energy and network services in Madeira 188,533                           
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Table 5 summarizes the annual revenue requirement of different regulated agents in the Portuguese 
electricity industry.  REN Trading recovers costs associated with its energy securities trading in the OMIP 
and procurement of energy related services.  Through the Global Use of System charges (UGS), REN 
recovers costs corresponding to transmission system operation, scheduling and dispatch, ancillary 
services, market operation dues (OMEL and OMIP), ERSE operating costs, stranded costs of old power 
purchase agreements and energy efficiency programs.  In general, the UGS costs are those that relate to 
energy policy.  EDP Distribuição is paid for the costs of operating the distribution network as well as 
payments to REN for transmission access.  As the retail supplier, EDP Serviço Universal recovers energy 
costs, in addition to both transmission and distribution access.  Thus, costs incurred by REN Trading, 
REN and EDP Distribuição are eventually passed through to end-use customers in the access tariffs paid 
to EDP Serviço Universal.   
 
2. TARIFFS 
Portugal has two distinct tariff designs: Tariffs of Last Resort (ToLR) and retail tariffs, although the retail 
tariffs are identical to the Tariffs of Last Resort for most small and medium customers.      
The Tariff of Last Resort is a regulated integral tariff comprised of the energy, energy policy and network-
related costs.  Competitive retail tariffs also include the regulated charges for network-related costs and 
some energy policy costs, but the other components are influenced by the retail market.  In Portugal, the 
tariff components that pertain to the network-related costs and the regulated energy policy costs are 
collectively called “access tariffs,” as they represent the costs incurred upon accessing the network.  The 
term access tariff will therefore be used hereafter, instead of “network tariff.”   
The most important characteristic of the access tariffs in Portugal is that they are uniform across the 
entire country.  They are differentiated by voltage category, but not by geographical location.  This 
characteristic introduces economic distortions in network cost allocation because network access in some 
regions is subsidized by consumers in others.  However, the access tariffs are differentially allocated 
across many voltage levels.  The charges therefore closely reflect the cost of delivering network services 
to customers connected at each of these voltage levels. 
The Portuguese regulator ERSE annually publishes detailed documents that provide information about 
the cost allocation formulas and methodology it uses to calculate the access tariffs and Tariffs of Last 
Resort.  ERSE also conducts public consultations on its annual tariff proposals.  The rate setting process 
is thus transparent and open to public scrutiny.  
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2.1 General Tariff Design 
Table 6 describes the general tariff architecture for the Portuguese access tariffs, for both transmission 
and distribution networks, and energy policy costs. 
Table 6.  General Tariff Design in Portugal 
Cost Components Customer Type Cost Allocation Rate Structure
(by consumption)
Generator Dedicated (deep) Fixed monthly (€/month) and daily (€/day)
Large Average by voltage category Fixed monthly (€/month) and daily (€/day)
Medium Average by voltage category Fixed monthly (€/month) and daily (€/day)
Small Average by voltage category Fixed monthly (€/month) and daily (€/day)
Very small Average by voltage category Fixed monthly (€/month) and daily (€/day)
Distributed Generator Dedicated (deep) Fixed monthly (€/month) and daily (€/day)
Large Average by voltage category 
and capacity
Monthly capacity (€/kW/month) 
and volume (€/kWh)
Medium Average by voltage category 
and capacity
Monthly capacity (€/kW/month) 
and volume (€/kWh)
Small Average by voltage category 
and capacity
Monthly capacity (€/kW/month) 
and volume (€/kWh)
Very small Average by voltage category 
and capacity
Monthly capacity (€/kW/month) 
and volume (€/kWh)
Distributed Generator Only when consuming As above
Generator None None
Large Postage stamp Monthly capacity (€/kW/month) 
and volume (€/kWh)
Medium Postage stamp Monthly capacity (€/kW/month) 
and volume (€/kWh)
Small Postage stamp Monthly capacity (€/kW/month) 
and volume (€/kWh)
Very small Postage stamp Monthly capacity (€/kW/month) 
and volume (€/kWh)
Commercial 
Services
Meter installations and 
reading;  billing services All Average
Fixed monthly (€/month) and 
daily (€/day)
Renewable Energy All Average by voltage category 
and capacity
Fixed monthly (€/month) and 
daily (€/day)
Others All Average by voltage category 
and capacity
Fixed monthly (€/month) and 
daily (€/day)
Energy Policy
Distribution 
UoS Charges
Shared network use; 
Common services like 
system control; 
Administrative costs of 
network operation
Connection 
Charges
Connection assets; 
Network reinforcement
Transmission 
UoS Charges
Shared network use; 
Common services like 
ancillary services; 
Administrative costs of 
network operation
 
All network users in Portugal pay connection charges, which differ by customer category.  Generators and 
distributed generators pay dedicated or deep connection charges that include costs for direct connection 
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to the network and network reinforcements.  Charges are in the form of a capacity charge (€/kW/year).  
End-users are responsible for an average connection charge that is inclusive of direct connection costs 
and network reinforcements, and depends on their voltage category.  Small and very small customers pay 
fixed monthly (€/month) and daily charges (€/day).  Medium and large customers pay monthly capacity 
(€//kW/month) and daily capacity (€/kW/day) charges.  Connection charges influence siting decisions for 
generators in the Portuguese system because such users are responsible for deep charges.  Most end-
use consumers are not affected because they pay a charge that is a system-wide capacity-weighted 
average.  
Distribution Use-of-System charges are calculated by voltage level.  ERSE uses detailed formulas to 
determine network usage and allocate costs at each voltage level.  Small customers pay fixed monthly 
(€/month) and daily charges (€/day), and also a charge that varies by consumption volume (€/kWh).  At 
higher voltage levels, customers pay a capacity-weighted average charge based on the voltage level to 
which they are connected.  Medium and large customers pay fixed monthly and daily capacity charges 
(€/kW/month and €/kW/day) and also by consumption volume (€/kWh).  Distributed generators do not pay 
for network use.    
Transmission Use-of-System charges are also calculated as an average across all transmission level 
customers, weighted by their capacity.  The average charge is, in effect, a postage stamp rate because of 
a single transmission network across the entire country.  Transmission level charges for network use are 
passed through to end-use customers in the final access tariff.  These charges appear in the form of a 
fixed monthly and daily capacity charge (€/kW/month or €/kW/day), and a charge that varies by 
consumption volume (€/kWh).  Generators do not pay use for network use.  As a result, the cost of 
network usage does not influence generator’s siting decisions.  Even if generators were to pay for 
network usage, the postage stamp rate would not provide a locational signal for the cost of network 
services at the transmission level.  However, congestion costs included in the wholesale energy price will 
partly influence generators’ siting decisions. 
Charges for commercial services such as meter reading, billing and other administrative expenses are 
calculated as an average across all customers connected to the electricity system.  Such charges are 
recovered through a fixed monthly charge (€/month), fixed daily charge (€/day) and volume charge 
(€/kWh), which are added to the other fixed monthly connection and Use-of-System charges.   
All customers connected to the network are responsible for a number of fixed charges designed to 
recover costs related to energy policy (UGS charges) as summarized in Table 5.  Such charges are 
passed through to customers in the form of fixed monthly (€/month) and daily (€/charges), and added to 
the charges discussed above. 
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2.2 Rate Design 
ERSE calculates and publishes the final rates for Tariffs of Last Resort, which are updated annually.  
EDP Serviço Universal (EDP SU) is the main ToLR supplier in Portugal, along with small independent 
cooperatives.  Table 7 and 8 lists final ToLR rates for selected customer categories, as offered by EDP 
SU.  Residential and business customers of all sizes qualify for regulated ToLR rates.  Customers sign an 
annual contract with EDP SU and are charged fixed monthly and daily charges (€/month and €/day) and 
energy charges (€/kWh) based on the volume of electricity consumed.  Two-period and three-period time-
of-use options with peak and off-peak rates are available to small customers. Large customers are placed 
on time-of-use tariffs with seasonal variations.  All customers are placed on ToLR service unless they 
choose to contract with a retail supplier. 
Two tariff categories within the ToLR are designed for special consumer groups.  Small residential 
customers in low-income groups or senior citizens may qualify for the “Social Tariff,” a subsidized tariff 
under the ToLR arrangement for connections at 1.15 kV below.  Such customers pay reduced fixed 
monthly and daily charges (€/month and €/day) and volume-based energy charges (€/kWh).  Small 
residential customers connected at 2.30 kVA are not eligible for the subsidized rate and are offered the 
Standard Tariff, but have an identical charge structure.  The Social Tariff and the Standard Tariff are only 
available to residential customers.  
Medium and large customers that are on ToLR see the rate structure shown in Table 8.  The tariffs for 
customers connected at very high voltage levels (> 110 kVA) are used as an example.  Connection 
charges are in the form of monthly and daily capacity charges (€/kW/month and €/kW/day).  The volume-
based energy charges (€/kWh) are differentiated by time-of-use into three daily periods and four seasons.  
Medium and large customers are also required to pay separate charges per unit of reactive power drawn 
from the network (€/kVArh).  On the other hand, they are paid if they supply more reactive power than 
they consume. 
Customers who are not on a ToLR arrangement can contract for retail supply from EDP Comercial, or 
another supplier such as Iberdrola, Endesa or Union Fenosa.  The distribution company, EDP 
Distribuição, continues to serve as the billing agent.  ERSE publishes the access tariffs for customers 
who choose to procure energy from retail suppliers, as shown in Table 9.  Selected customer categories 
are displayed to gain an understanding of the rate structure, which is identical to the ToLR rate structures 
shown in Tables 7 and 8.   
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Table 7.  Tariffs of Last Resort for Low Voltage Customers in Portugal (2009) 
Data Source: ERSE, EDP Serviço Universal (2009) 
Voltage Category Voltage
(kVA)
1.15
2.30
1.15
2.30
Single 
Rate
Time of 
Use
Single 
Rate
Time of 
Use Peak Flat Off-peak
3.45 5.65 7.76 0.186 0.255 Single Rate
10.35 15.44 14.35 0.508 0.472 Two-period 0.066
20.70 29.93 39.44 0.984 1.297 Three-period 0.136 0.120 0.066
Average High Average High Peak Flat Off-peak
27.60 51.33 209.74 1.687 6.895 Average use 0.241 0.109 0.059
41.40 76.45 314.54 2.513 10.341 High Use 0.145 0.083 0.054
0.123
Normal Low Voltage 
(2.3 to 20.7 kVA)
Normal Low Voltage 
(> 20.7 kVA)
0.115
0.115
0.115
0.121
Energy Charge
Fixed Daily 
Charge
(€/day)
0.017
0.034
0.068
0.135
(€/kWh)
0.115Normal Low Voltage 
(Social Tariff)
Normal Low Voltage 
(Standard Tariff)
Fixed Monthly 
Charge
(€/month)
0.51
1.02
2.05
4.09
 
Table 8.  Tariffs of Last Resort for Very High Voltage Customers in Portugal (2009) 
Data Source: ERSE, EDP Serviço Universal (2009) 
Fixed Charges
Fixed Capacity Charges
Peak
Contracted
Energy Prices
Season Peak Flat Off-peak Very low
I 0.078 0.059 0.038 0.036
II 0.079 0.062 0.041 0.038
III 0.079 0.062 0.041 0.038
IV 0.078 0.059 0.038 0.036
Reactive Power
Supplied
Drawn
0.016
0.012
(€/kVArh)
(€/month) (€/day)
(€/kW/month) (€/kW/day)
73.68 2.423
(€/kWh)
4.364
0.546
0.144
0.018
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The high degree of differentiation in access tariffs by voltage category and time of use reflects the cost of 
providing network services at various voltage levels, and times of the day and year.  Moreover, the ToLR 
rates are also good indicator of the cost differences, because the ToLR rate structure is identical to that of 
the access tariffs, which are passed through.  The charges for reactive power provide medium and large 
customers with the incentive to maintain their load at a high power factor by reducing the amount of 
reactive power drawn from the network.  They are also paid if they can supply reactive power to the grid, 
which increase the power quality in the network. 
Table 9.  Access Tariffs for Selected Customer Categories (2009) 
Source: ERSE (2009) 
Small Low Voltage Customers (<=2.3 kVA)
Fixed (€/month) (€/day)
Social 1.15 1.09 0.0360
Standard 2.3 2.19 0.0719
Energy
Social/Standard
Low Voltage Customers (>= 27.6 kVA)
Fixed (€/month) (€/day)
27.6 26.25 0.8629
34.5 32.81 1.0787
41.4 39.37 1.2944
Energy
Peak
Flat
Off-peak
Very High Voltage Customers (>110 kVA)
Fixed (€/kW/month) (€/kW/day)
Peak 1.125 0.0370
Contracted 0.361 0.0119
Energy
Peak
Períodos I, IV Flat
Off-peak
very low
Peak
Períodos II, III Flat
Off-peak
very low
Reactive Power
Supplied
Drawn
Rates
(€/kWh)
0.0294
0.0120
Rates
(€/kWh)
0.1392
0.0332
0.0067
-0.0030
-0.0030
(€/kVArh)
0.0161
-0.0031
-0.0030
-0.0029
-0.0029
Rates
(€/kWh)
-0.0029
-0.0029
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2.3  ToLR Distortions 
Integral tariffs like the Tariffs of Last Resort may introduce significant distortions in the economic 
performance of the electricity industry because the incurred costs may be significantly higher than the 
annual revenue requirements originally approved.  Consequently, the regulated rates may not always be 
sufficient to recover the incurred costs.  In most cases, annual settlements are sufficient to reconcile any 
deviations of the incurred costs from the expected revenue requirements, with minor rate impacts in 
subsequent years.  However, the distortion is acute when the realized costs deviate significantly from the 
expected costs in a given year, and the deviations cannot be settled in the following annual review period 
due to significant rate impacts.  The energy cost component of the regulated ToLR is prone to such 
deviations because the rate does not reflect the volatility in the costs of energy procured in the wholesale 
electricity market.  The ToLR rates thus lock-in an expected price of energy.  In the competitive retail 
sector, energy prices are passed through to customers in each billing cycle, through which retailers can 
recover their energy costs.  The distortion is therefore limited to the regulated tariff segment of the 
industry, affecting the regulated entities operating in that segment.  In Portugal, such a distortion was 
observed between the years 2007 and 2009 when the realized energy costs were much higher than 
expected.  For the sake of illustration, the deviation between the revenue review periods for 2008 and 
2009 is depicted in Figure 4.       
 
Figure 4.  Access Tariffs for Selected Customer Categories (2009) 
Source: ERSE (2009) 
Between the end of 2007 and 2008, the energy costs incurred by the providers of ToLR increased by 
42% (Energia), whereas the network-related costs (Redes) were stable, and a small decrease was 
realized in the general system operation costs (UGS).  The energy cost increase can be attributed to high 
                     
Page 80 of 108 
wholesale market prices (deficit of € 1,276 million), exacerbated by large payments to Special Regime 
generators (deficit of € 447 million).  The tariffs for 2009 were revised by introducing a tariff deficit to defer 
cost recovery, instead of settling the cost increase the following year.  The tariff deficit was a policy 
mechanism to avoid a large rate impact, which was politically and socially undesirable.  Consequently, 
the aggregate increase in expected ToLR revenues was only 14% over the 2008 tariffs.  The deficit was 
introduced in the access tariff component of the ToLR revenue requirements, to enable the regulated 
network companies and providers of ToLR to make payments to regular and Special Regime generators 
for the energy services procured.  The mechanism thus resulted in incomplete cost recovery on the part 
of the regulated network companies that would have recovered their costs through the access tariffs.  The 
deficit was subsequently securitized as long-term debt, to be recovered by the network companies 
between 2010 and 2024.  Although the deficit mechanism will result in eventual reconciliation of costs 
incurred by the system, it is not a long-run solution to avoid future economic distortions as a consequence 
of regulated integral tariffs. 
The effects of the economic distortion introduced by the regulated ToLR due to high energy costs are 
evidenced in part by the trend of customer switching from retail to regulated tariffs.  While the retail 
energy prices rose as a consequence of high energy costs, ToLR rates stayed relatively constant.  The 
network-related costs were relatively stable as shown in Figure 4.  As a consequence, many customers in 
Portugal that had switched from regulated tariffs to competitive retail contracts during the course of 
restructuring began to switch back to ToLR between 2006 and 2008.  Switching was most significant in 
the medium and large voltage categories, i.e. categories with high energy consumption.  Figure 5 depicts 
this trend graphically.  Values of consumption for each customer category are summarized in Table 10.   
As described above, Special Regime payments to large-scale renewables and distributed generators 
contributed significantly to the dramatic increase in energy costs (€ 447 million).  The regulated tariffs and 
premiums under the SR are therefore a costly incentive to such generators.  Distributed generators, in 
particular, receive special rates for the net metered electricity supplied, as described in Table 2.  When 
such generators consume more electricity than they generate, they are charged according to the 
appropriate customer category for the net electricity consumed.  On the other hand, they receive 
payments when they supply surplus electricity back to the distribution network.  In many cases, the 
special tariff rate used is higher than the final ToLR rate or retail tariff rate.  Furthermore, payments to 
distributed generation under the SR are recovered from all customers through the access tariff.  Such 
generators therefore receive a subsidy for being connected to the system – in effect, they are paid for 
using the network when they supply net-metered electricity to the grid, and the corresponding costs of 
network use are borne by end-use customers. 
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Table 10.  Electricity Consumption under ToLR and Retail Tariffs (2004 - 2008) 
Source: ERSE (2009) 
Voltage Level
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Regulated Tariffs
Very high 1,224         1,278         1,394         1,527         1,667         
High 4,345         5,153         5,361         6,265         6,358         
Medium 6,522         5,105         8,603         10,290       14,052       
Low 18,126       19,024       19,235       19,523       18,364       
Special 3,159         2,351         2,312         2,491         3,340         
Sub-total* 34,594       34,211       38,304       41,546       45,289       
Competitive Retail Supply
Very high -            37              41              3                -            
High 49              144            98              11              2                
Medium 6,680         8,489         5,820         4,098         263            
Low -            -            13              264            695            
Special 33              950            1,190         996            219            
Sub-total 6,763         9,621         7,161         5,373         1,180         
Total 41,357       43,832       45,465       46,919       46,469       
Electricity Consumption
(GWh)
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Figure 5.  Aggregate Electricity Consumption under ToLR and Retail Tariffs (2004 - 2008) 
Source: ERSE (2009) 
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SPAIN 
Most customers in Spain are on a Tariff of Last Resort, a regulated integral tariff.  This arrangement is a 
policy choice that allows small customers, both residential and business, access to electricity at fixed 
prices.  Medium and large customers can contract with retail suppliers for contract or negotiated rates.  
Spanish customers pay access tariffs that are comprised of both network and energy policy costs, about 
half the cost of which can be attributed to the latter.  Moreover, the tariffs are uniform across the entire 
country, with differentiations only by voltage levels and time of use.  The inclusion of large energy policy 
costs and the lack of geographical differentiation do not allow the access tariffs to reflect the cost of 
providing network service to individual customers.  Furthermore, distributed generators receive subsidies 
through the Special Regime mechanism, in effect raising access costs for end-use customers.   
 
Figure 1.  Spanish Electricity System (GENI 2009) 
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1. SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS 
The Spanish electricity system is characterized by a high degree of restructuring.  The wholesale market, 
transmission and distribution networks, and retail electricity supply are managed independently by legally 
separate entities.   
1.1 Generation 
The generation sector of the Spanish electricity system operates under a wholesale market framework.  
Operador del Mercado Ibérico de Energia – Polo Español, S.A. (OMEL), a not-for-profit corporation 
instituted in 1997, is the wholesale market operator.  OMEL does not own any generating capacity.  
Generators are primarily owned by independent power producers (IPPs) and distributed generators. 
OMEL is the market operator and the billing agent for settlements between various market participants 
such as IPPs, Special Regime generators, distribution companies and retailers.  Bilateral contracts 
between generators and customers are permitted, with any imbalances purchased in the spot market.  
The market is therefore a net pool.  The spot market has day-ahead and real-time segments.  The costs 
of market operation are paid by all consumers connected to the electricity network in the form of dues 
included in the access tariffs.  OMEL procures ancillary services such as black start capability and voltage 
and frequency regulation through parallel ancillary services markets.  The cost of ancillary services is 
included in the energy prices to consumers.  Payments to ancillary services providers are made through 
monthly and annual settlement processes. 
OMEL coordinates its operations with the Portuguese market operator OMIP to enable the functioning of 
the Iberian market which is comprised of Portugal and Spain.  The joint Iberian market facilitates the 
cross-border trade of electricity between the two countries.  It also has provisions for market splitting 
during peak hours when congestion conditions are experienced across the interconnections and during 
emergencies.  An explicit market splitting fee is included in the access tariffs to pay for this service. 
Peaking and reserve capacity is procured through a capacity payment system, where generators are paid 
regulated prices to be available during peak hours.  The prices for capacity payments are included in the 
access tariffs and recovered from all customers in the system. 
Table 1 displays the profile of the generation sector.  Combined cycle gas plants represent the largest 
share of generation capacity (24%), followed by wind (19%) and hydroelectric power (17%).  Large-scale 
renewable generators and distributed generators are subject to a Special Regime within the market, as 
discussed below.  These technologies collectively contribute about 33% of the generation capacity in 
Spain and receive special tariffs and premiums.  
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Table 1.  Generation Sector Profile in Spain 
Data Source:   OMEL, RED Eléctrica (2009) 
Fuel Source
Nameplate 
Capacity
Percentage 
Capacity
(MW)
Hydro 16,658                    17%
Nuclear 7,716                      8%
Coal 11,869                    12%
Oil/Gas 6,907                      7%
Combined Cycle 23,635                    24%
Wind 18,263                    19%
Solar 3,729                      4%
Other renewables 9,725                      10%
Total 98,502                    100%
 
The Special Regime (SR) is a mechanism to enable the achievement of targets for the penetration of 
renewable generation technologies and combined heat and power (CHP) applications in the Spanish 
electricity system.  The main characteristic of the SR is the provision of financial premiums to certain 
generation technologies, as an incentive to enter the market and deliver electricity at desired levels of 
reliability and quality. 
Table 2.  Description and Examples of the Special Regime for Generation 
Data Source: Royal Decree 661/2007 (2009) 
Category Application Principal Fuels Technology Example Tariffs Premiums
a.
Combined Heat 
and Power (CHP)
Natural gas, Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), 
biomass or biogas, other fossil fuels including 
coal and oil
Liquefied Natural Gas   
1 < Capacity < 10 MW    9.62 4.03
b. Renewable generation
Photovoltaic and solar thermal, wind, 
geothermal, bio-waste, hydro-electric (less than 
10 MW, between 10 and 50 MW)
Photovoltaic      
Capacity < 10 kW (for 
the first 25 years)
47.02 -
c.
CHP or 
renewable 
generation
Wastes and residues produced by applications 
in categories (a) and (b) Solid urban waste 5.36 2.75
(c€/kWh)
 
The primary technology categories included in the Regime are listed in Table 2.  Many SR generators 
connect to the network at distribution voltage-levels as distributed generators, due to their small 
generating capacity.  Distribution companies are required to enter into connection agreements with 
qualifying generators, pursuant to specific technical and operating requirements.  Some larger facilities 
are also eligible to connect directly to the transmission network.  Such generators are entitled to transfer 
all of the electricity generated to the network, net of their consumption.  These generators also enjoy 
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priority of access and connection to the grid.  That is, Special Regime generators are connected to the 
grid before other generators in the queue, and any net transfer by such generators must be accepted 
before other generators in that region of the network are dispatched.  When these generators have 
fulfilled the technical and operating requirements as specified in their connection agreements with 
network companies, they receive the appropriate regulated tariff or the wholesale market price, and a 
premium in some cases.  SR generators can also sell electricity to consumers through a direct connection 
and bilateral contracts, and are not required to sell to the grid or in the wholesale market.  Table 2 also 
includes selected examples of the regulated tariffs and premiums received by some typical categories of 
SR generators.  Costs corresponding to Special Regime payments are recovered from all consumers 
connected to the network through “access tariffs,” as discussed later.   
 
1.2 Networks 
The transmission network in Spain is operated as a single national network, although several entities own 
transmission assets.  Distribution networks are owned and operated by separate distribution companies. 
RED Eléctrica is the national transmission system operator (TSO).  It has exclusive concessionary rights 
to own and operate the transmission system.  Pursuant to restructuring laws, all transmission owners 
were required to transfer transmission assets to RED Eléctrica for ownership and operation under its 
exclusive license.  Thus, most of the transmission network assets are now owned and managed by RED 
Eléctrica.  However, some entities still own a small share of the transmission network.  The other 
transmission owners are distribution companies with high voltage assets in their grids.  These distribution 
networks are required to sign agreements with RED Eléctrica, allowing it to operate their high voltage 
assets as part of the transmission network.  The RED Eléctrica Corporation is a holding company, of 
which 20% is owned by the state.  The majority share is owned by other private Spanish institutions 
(26%), minority shareholders (7%), and foreign institutions (47%).  The Corporation also owns a 5% state 
in the Portuguese transmission system REN, in addition to international telecommunications and finance 
business.  The network line lengths and new investments in the transmission network undertaken by RED 
Electrica for the period 2005 – 2009 are summarized in Table 3.  The annual revenue requirements 
(ARR) for the transmission owners are listed in Table 4.  The ARR for each company is approved by the 
Spanish National Energy Commission (Comisión Nacíonal de Energía, CNE) and submitted to the 
Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce (MITC) for inclusion in the access tariff calculation.  RED 
Eléctrica’s share is 85% of the transmission network in terms of line length, and 93% in terms of ARR. 
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Table 3.  Transmission Line Lengths and Investments (2005 – 2009) 
Data Source: RED Eléctrica (2009) 
Voltage
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
RED Electrica 16,808       17,005    17,134    17,686    17,988    
Others 38              38           38           38           38           
RED Electrica 16,288       16,498    16,535    16,637    16,771    
Others 245            261         266         273         276         
RED Electrica 2,192         2,185      2,309      2,330      2,343      
and Others
35,571       35,987    36,282    36,964    37,416    
All 420 510 608 614 800
(2009 million Euros)
Total
Line Length 
(kilometers)
Investments
220 kV    
or below
200 kV    
or below
400 kV
Spanish Mainland
Islands
 
 
Table 4.  Transmission Entities’ Annual Revenue Requirements ( 2009) 
Data Source: MITC Order 3801/2007 (2009) 
Transmission Company
Annual Revenue 
Requirements
(2009 € Thousands)
Red Eléctrica de España, S.A. 1,129,116                     
Iberdrola Distribución Eléctrica, S.A.U. 22                                 
Unión Fenosa Distribución, S.A. 40,096                          
Endesa, S.A. (Peninsular) 7,397                            
Hidrocantábrico Distribución Eléctrica, S.A. 30,466                          
Endesa, S.A. (Extrapeninsular) 136,924                        
Total 1,344,021                     
 
Figure 2 depicts the transmission interconnections between Spain and neighboring countries in Europe 
and Africa.  Spain primarily imports power from France and exports power to Portugal, Morocco and 
Andorra.  Thus, Spain could be considered a user of the French networks, whereas the other countries 
could be though of as users of the Spanish network.  However, the net exports were approximately 3% of 
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Spain’s national electricity consumption in 2009, making international network use a small part of total 
network use.  The statistics are summarized in Table 5.  
Table 5.  Electricity Exports to Neighboring Countries (2005 – 2009) 
Source: RED Eléctrica (2009) 
Year
Total 
Exports
National 
Consumption
Percentage 
Exports
(GWh) (GWh)
France Portugal Andorra Morocco
2005 (6,545)     6,829       271          788          1,343       260,688           0.52%
2006 (4,410)     5,458       229          2,002       3,279       268,092           1.22%
2007 (5,487)     7,497       261          3,479       5,750       276,927           2.08%
2008 (2,889)     9,439       278          4,212       11,040     279,182           3.95%
2009 (1,766)     5,239       295          4,630       8,398       266,873           3.15%
(GWh)
Exports / (Imports)
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Transmission Interconnections to Neighboring Countries 
Source: RED Eléctrica (2009) 
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Table 6.  Distribution Entities’ Annual Revenue Requirements and                                   
Third Party Access Costs (2009) 
Data Source: MITC Order 3801/2007 (2009) 
Distribution Company
Annual Revenue 
Requirements Third Party Access Costs
Iberdrola Distribución Eléctrica, SAU 1,484,625                                122,534                               
Unión Fenosa Distribución, SA 697,630                                   42,388                                 
Hidrocantábrico Distribución Eléctrica, SA 139,668                                   7,966                                   
Electra de Viesgo Distribución, SA 134,321                                   6,861                                   
Endesa (mainland Spain) 1,634,031                                113,000                               
Endesa (extra-peninsular) 325,242                                   19,841                                 
FEVASA 182                                          41                                        
SOLANAR 323                                          9                                          
Total 4,416,022                                312,640                               
(2009 € Thousands)
 
Distribution networks in Spain are owned by large investor owned utilities (IOU) such as Iberdrola and 
Endesa and small local municipal companies.  Such companies are responsible for providing network 
services to customers in their service areas.  The large IOUs and some municipal companies offer Tariffs 
of Last Resort.  IOUs offer retail supply through legally separated retail companies.   The annual revenue 
requirements of the large IOUs and the Third Party Access (TPA) or connection costs are listed in Table 
6.  These costs are recovered from all customers through the access tariffs, as set by the MITC.   
2. TARIFFS 
Spain has two distinct tariff designs: Tariffs of Last Resort (ToLR) and retail tariffs.  The Tariff of Last 
Resort is a regulated integral tariff comprised of the energy, energy policy and network-related costs.  In 
competitive retail tariffs, the charges for network-related costs and some energy policy costs are 
regulated, while the other components are influenced by the retail market.  In Spain, the tariff components 
that pertain to the network-related costs and the regulated energy policy costs are collectively called 
“access tariffs,” as they represent the costs for accessing the network.  The term access tariff will 
therefore be used hereafter in the Spanish context, instead of “network tariff.”   
The most important characteristic of the access tariffs in Spain is that they are uniform across the entire 
country.  They are differentiated by voltage category, but not by geographical location.  This characteristic 
introduces economic distortions in network cost allocation because network access in some regions is 
subsidized by consumers in others.   
An important implication of the Spanish tariff designs is that the final rates are not decomposable into 
their constituent components by inspection.  That is, the final rate cannot be separated into costs of 
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energy, network or other costs because end users see a single rate, as published by the rate-setting 
authority. 
2.1 General Tariff Design 
 
Figure 3.  Cost Components in the Spanish Network Tariff Designs 
Source: CNE (2009) 
Figure 3 depicts the components of the two different Spanish tariff designs.  The ToLR design results in a 
regulated final price of electricity, and is comprised of energy, network, energy policy and commercial or 
retail costs for distributors.  The retail design is also comprised of the same costs components, but the 
final price is not regulated.  The price for energy is based on the retailers’ energy procurement costs in 
the wholesale electricity market.  Retail suppliers have discretion over their commercial or retail margin.  
The access tariffs and charges for capacity payments are regulated.  As such, the retail tariff design is 
similar to those in electricity systems with competitive retail sectors. 
Table 7 describes the general tariff architecture for the Spanish access tariffs, for both transmission and 
distribution networks and energy policy costs.   
Connection charges in Spain differ by customer category.  Generators and distributed generators pay 
dedicated or deep connection charges that include costs for direct connection to the network and network 
reinforcements.  Charges are in the form of an annual capacity charge (€/kW/year).  Very small 
customers that subscribe to a protected social tariff category are exempt from connection charges.  All 
other end-users are responsible for an average connection charge that is inclusive of direct connection 
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costs and network reinforcements.  Both types of connection costs are included in the annual revenue 
requirements of the distribution company in a separate line item under the name Third Party Access 
(TPA).  The TPA costs are then aggregated across all the major distribution companies and subsequently 
included in the access tariff, as shown in Tables 6 and 8.  Connection costs are passed through to 
customers as an average price differentiated by capacity.  Small, medium and large customers pay a 
fixed annual capacity charge (€/kW/year).  Connection charges influence siting decisions for generators in 
the Spanish system, but not for consumers because consumers pay a charge that is a system-wide 
capacity-weighted average.  
Table 7.  General Tariff Design in Spain 
Cost Components Customer Type Cost Allocation Rate Structure
(by consumption)
Generator Dedicated (deep) Fixed annual capacity charge (€/kW/year)
Large Average by voltage category Fixed annual capacity charge (€/kW/year)
Medium Average by voltage category Fixed annual capacity charge (€/kW/year)
Small Average by voltage category Fixed annual capacity charge (€/kW/year)
Very small None None
Distributed Generator Dedicated (deep) Fixed annual capacity charge (€/kW/year)
Large Average by voltage category 
and capacity
Annual capacity (€/kW/year) and 
volume (€/kWh)
Medium Average by voltage category 
and capacity
Annual capacity (€/kW/year) and 
volume (€/kWh)
Small Average by voltage category 
and capacity
Annual capacity (€/kW/year) and 
volume (€/kWh)
Very small Average by voltage category 
and capacity
Monthly capacity (€/kW/month) 
and volume (€/kWh)
Distributed Generator None None
Generator None None
Large Postage stamp Annual capacity (€/kW/year) and 
volume (€/kWh)
Medium Postage stamp Annual capacity (€/kW/year) and 
volume (€/kWh)
Small Postage stamp Annual capacity (€/kW/year) and 
volume (€/kWh)
Very small Postage stamp Annual capacity (€/kW/year) and 
volume (€/kWh)
Commercial 
Services
Meter installations and 
reading;  billing services All Average Fixed monthly ($/month)
Renewable Energy All Average by voltage category 
and capacity Fixed monthly ($/month)
Others All Average by voltage category 
and capacity Fixed monthly ($/month)
Energy Policy
Distribution 
UoS Charges
Shared network use; 
Common services like 
system control; 
Administrative costs of 
network operation
Connection 
Charges
Connection assets; 
Network reinforcement
Transmission 
UoS Charges
Shared network use; 
Common services like 
ancillary services; 
Administrative costs of 
network operation
 
Distribution Use-of-System charges are calculated by voltage level.  The Spanish CNE uses a network 
model to allocate costs and determines network usage at each voltage level, weighted by peak demand.  
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Customers pay an average charge based on the voltage level to which they are connected, weighted by 
their capacity.  Small customers pay a fixed annual charge (€/kW/year) and also a charge that varies by 
consumption volume (€/kWh).  Medium and large customers pay fixed monthly charges (€/kW/month) and 
also by consumption volume (€/kWh).  Distributed generators do not pay for network use.    
Transmission Use-of-System charges are also calculated as an average across all transmission level 
customers, weighted by their capacity.  The average charge is, in effect, a postage stamp rate because of 
a single transmission network across the entire country.  Transmission level charges for network use are 
passed through to end-use customers in the final access tariff.  These charges appear in the form of a 
fixed monthly or annual fee (€/kW/year or €/kW/month), depending on customer type, and a charge that 
varies by consumption volume (€/kWh).   Generators do not pay use for network use.  As a result, the 
cost of network usage does not influence generator’s siting decisions.  Even if generators were to pay for 
network usage, the postage stamp rate would not provide a locational signal for the cost of network 
services at the transmission level.  However, congestion costs included in the wholesale energy price will 
partly influence generators’ siting decisions. 
Charges for commercial services such as meter reading, billing and other administrative expenses are 
calculated as an average across all customers connected to the electricity system.  Such charges are 
recovered through a fixed monthly charge (€/month), which is added to the other fixed monthly 
connection and Use-of-System charges.   
All customers connected to the network are responsible for a number of fixed charges designed to 
recover costs related to energy policy.  These include payments to the nuclear sector, fees for market 
operation and the National Energy Commission (CNE), the Special Prime System and the deficit of 
regulated activities.  The costs are itemized in Table 8.  Total payments for nuclear moratoria and fuel 
processing are allocated as a fixed percentage of the total transmission and distribution costs to the 
different customer categories.  The same process is used for Commission fees and market operation 
dues.  The costs of the Special Prime system, subsidies to populations in the island groups, and the 
regulated deficit are allocated using the Ramsey principle, in a manner that is inversely proportional to 
consumers’ price elasticity of demand.  That is, customers with relatively inelastic demand are allocated a 
higher proportion of such costs than customers with relatively elastic demand.  Such charges are passed 
through in the form of fixed monthly (€/month) or annual charges (€/year) depending on customer type. 
Table 8 lists the cost types that are included in the access tariffs and their relative contribution to the total 
access cost.  Approximately 47% of the access tariffs can be attributed to the capital and operating costs 
of networks.  Distribution (76%) represents the largest share of network costs, followed by transmission 
(19%).  Third Party Access (TPA) or connection costs across the entire electricity system are also 
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included in access tariffs, but are only 5% of network costs.  Lastly, system operation costs incurred by 
RED Eléctrica as the Transmission System Operator contribute less than 1% to the total network costs. 
Table 8.  Cost Components in the Spanish Access Tariff 
Source: CNE (2009) 
Cost Percentage Cost
(2009 € Millions)
Network Costs
Transmission 1,293                       19.3%
Distribution 5,072                       75.5%
Third Party Access (TPA) 
(connection costs) 313                          4.7%
System Operation 38                            0.6%
Sub-total 6,715                       100%
Energy Policy
Diversification and               
Security of Supply 824                          11%
Nuclear moratorium 3                                      
Nuclear fuel cycle 71                                    
Market interruptibility system 750                                  
Special Prime System         
(Renewables and Cogeneration) 4,009                       52%
Deficit of Regulated Activities 1,468                       19%
Fixed Costs 1,391                       18%
Extra-peninsular Compensation 1,295                               
Market Operation 11                                    
National Energy Commission 20                                    
Other fixed costs 65                                    
Sub-total 7,692                       100%
Total 14,407                 
Cost Item
 
The energy policy components (53%) of access tariffs include a variety of costs, as listed in Table 8.  
Over 50% of energy policy costs can be attributed to the Special Prime System (or Special Regime), i.e. 
incentive payments to large-scale renewable energy and cogeneration sources, and distributed 
generation.  Another 20% can be attributed to an access tariff deficit, explained in further detail in a later 
section.  Energy and network access subsidies to the populations living in the island groups such as the 
Balearic and Canary Islands comprise over 90% of the fixed energy policy costs (18%). Consequently, 
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energy policy costs that are unrelated to the costs of network ownership and operation are more than half 
of the total access costs in the Spanish system. 
In summary, the network costs in Spain are added to costs that are incurred due to energy policy and 
allocated to different customer categories through regulated access tariffs. Each of the network and 
energy policy costs contributes roughly 50% to the access tariffs.  The access tariffs are common to both 
the tariffs of Last Resort and the competitive retail tariffs.  Customers pay an average charge for their 
voltage level, weighted by their monthly or annual capacity.  Customers also pay variable charges as a 
function of their energy consumption.   
Although the different cost categories can be itemized for the purpose of cost allocation, the final prices 
cannot be decomposed into to the constituent components as evidenced by the final rate structure. 
2.2 Rate Design 
The Spanish Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce (MITC) calculates and publishes the final rates 
for the Tariffs of Last Resort, which are updated annually.  Inputs such as energy costs, access tariffs and 
retail margins for the distribution companies are included in the calculation.  The specific formulas and 
methodology used to arrive at the final rates is not published.  The National Energy Commission is 
required to propose the cost allocation method to the Ministry, based on its models and data submitted by 
the generators, network companies and retailers.  However, the Ministry has final authority over the 
method used and published rates. 
Table 9 lists the Tariffs of Last Resort that came into effect on July 1, 2009.  Both residential and 
business customers at low voltage levels (< 10 kW) are covered by these tariff categories.  Distribution 
companies in Spain are required to offer ToLR to such customers.  Customers sign an annual contract 
with the distribution company and are charged annual capacity charges (€/kW/year) and energy charges 
(€/kWh) based on the volume of electricity consumed.  A time-of-use option with peak and off-peak rates 
is also available.  The ToLR is applicable only to connections below 10 kW; consumers are placed on 
ToLR service unless they choose to contract with a retail supplier.   
Two tariff categories within the ToLR are designed for special consumer groups.  Small residential 
customers in low-income groups, or senior citizens may qualify for the “Social Rate,” a subsidized tariff 
under the ToLR arrangement.  Such customers pay reduced fixed monthly and energy charges.  They 
can also elect for the time-of-use option.  Other groups such as small rural customers that would not 
otherwise be able to afford electricity costs are eligible for the “Social Allowance.”  Rates are further 
subsidized in this category, with no obligations for fixed monthly or annual charges for customers 
connected at < 3 kW.  Such customers only pay for the energy consumed.  Customers connected at < 1 
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kW pay a very small fixed monthly fee, and for the energy consumerd.  The Social Rate and the Social 
Tariff are only available to residential customers. 
Table 9.  Tariffs of Last Resort (ToLR) in Spain (2009) 
Data Source: MITC Order 1659, 1723/2009, CNE (2009) 
Connection 
Capacity
Time-of-Use 
Variations Fixed Charge Variable Charge
Residential and Business ( € / kW / year) ( € / kWh)
< 10 kW Single rate 20.102 0.115
Peak 0.137
Valley 0.061
( € / kW / month) ( € / kWh)
10 kW <...<15 kW Single rate 2.080 0.133
Peak 0.143
Valley 0.063
Peak 0.150
Flat 0.121
Valley 0.082
Social Rate ( € / kW / month) ( € / kWh)
< 10 kW Single rate 1.642 0.112
Peak 0.135
Valley 0.060
Social Allowance
< 3 kW Single rate 0.000 0.112
< 1 kW Single rate 0.402 0.089
< 10 kW 20.102
< 10 kW 1.642
10 kW <...<15 kW 1.859
> 15 kW 1.859
 
The MITC published reference tariffs for customers above 10 kW who are still on integral tariff contracts 
under historical arrangements.  Such customers are now subject to the pricing scheme listed in Table 9 
(10 kW <…<15 kW, and > 15 kW) until December 31, 2009, by when they are expected to have 
transitioned to retail arrangements.  The published reference tariffs for these categories are integral 
tariffs, similar to the ToLR. 
Medium and large customers are not eligible for tariffs of Last Resort and must therefore contract with 
retail suppliers for electricity.  The distribution company continues to serve as the billing agent.  The MITC 
publishes the access tariffs for customers who currently procure energy from retail suppliers, as shown in 
Table 10.  For connections between 10 and 15 kW a two-part access tariff is offered.  Customers with 
connection capacities greater than 15 kW can choose between three-period or six-period time-of-use 
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tariffs.  Customers connected at voltage levels greater than 36 kV are automatically placed on six-period 
time of use tariffs, as shown in Table 10.  Figure 4 depicts the how the time periods are organized, with 
daily and monthly variations.  Medium and large customers also pay charges for reactive power based on 
the amount of reactive power necessary (€/kVArh) to maintain the quality of power of their connection.  
The unit charge decreases as the power factor of the customer’s load increases, as shown in Table 10. 
  
Table 10.  Access Tariffs for Medium and Large Customers in Spain (2009) 
Data Source: MITC Order 1723/ 2009 (2009) 
Capacity
(at < 1 kV)
Period 1
Period 2
> 15 kW Period 1
Period 2
Period 3
Voltage Category Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Period 6
1 - 36 kV 13.12      6.57        4.81        4.80       4.81        2.19        
36 - 72.5 kV 11.30      5.65        4.14        4.14       4.14        1.89        
72.5 - 145 kV 10.61      5.31        3.89        3.89       3.89        1.77        
>= 145 kV 9.86        4.93        3.61        3.61       3.61        1.65        
1 - 36 kV 0.046      0.038      0.022      0.012     0.008      0.006      
36 - 72.5 kV 0.015      0.012      0.007      0.004     0.003      0.002      
72.5 - 145 kV 0.012      0.010      0.006      0.003     0.002      0.002      
>= 145 kV 0.009      0.008      0.005      0.003     0.002      0.001      
Power Factor
0.90 <…< 0.95
0.85 <…< 0.90
0.80 <…< 0.85
...< 0.80
10 kW<…<15 kW
6.53
4.35
0.048
0.033
0.013
10.89
24.34 0.0650.017
Fixed Capacity Charge
(€/kW/year)
Energy Charge
(€/kWh)
0.017018
0.034037
0.051056
Fixed Capacity Charge (€/kW/year)
Energy Charge (€/kWh)
Reactive Power Charge (€/kVArh)
0.000013
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Figure 4.  Time-of-Use Periods for Medium and Large Customers in Spain (2009) 
Source: CNE (2009) 
Selected retail prices for medium and large customers for a single contract year are listed in Table 11.  
The rates offered by Iberdrola S.A., a large distribution company that also has a legally separated retail 
business, are used for the purpose of this analysis.  Customers with connections below 10 kW are offered 
retail prices identical to the ToLR rates published by the MITC.  Customers with connections greater than 
10 kW are offered contract rates determined by Iberdrola.  A comparison with Table 10 indicates the 
difference between the access tariff rates and the retail rates.  Iberdrola’s retail rates are higher in each 
case, and the difference can be attributed to the costs of energy and the company’s retail margins.  The 
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difference appears mostly in the energy charge component (€/kWh).  Although the examples used here 
are specific to Iberdrola, the general retail tariff design is similar across retail suppliers in Spain. 
 
Table 11.  Retail Tariffs for Medium and Large Iberdrola Customers (2009) 
Data Source: Iberdrola (2009) 
Connection 
Capacity
Time-of-Use 
Variations Fixed Charge Variable Charge
( € / kW / year) ( € / kWh)
Single rate 25.207 0.127
Peak 25.525 0.143
Flat 25.525 0.061
Valley 25.525 0.061
Peak 11.263 0.143
Flat 6.758 0.115
Valley 4.505 0.078
> 15 kW
10 kW<...<15 kW
 
Customers that are connected at voltage levels greater than 1 kV are not offered pre-determined retail 
contracts, but are offered negotiated rates which include the access tariffs as a component.  Larger 
customers can effectively negotiate energy supply contracts with retail suppliers, because the regulated 
access tariff is simply passed through to such customers.  The six-period time of use access tariff is 
designed to reflect the costs of delivering network services at different times of the day and year.  
However, this design may not accurately reflect such costs because the proportion of fixed energy policy 
related costs included in the access tariff is quite large.  The fee for reactive power provides such 
customers with the incentive to maintain their load at a high power factor; a power factor very close to 
unity allows such customers to minimize or avoid reactive power charges. 
2.3 ToLR Distortions 
Integral tariffs like the Tariffs of Last Resort may introduce significant distortions in the economic 
performance of the electricity industry because the incurred costs may be significantly higher than the 
annual revenue requirements originally approved.  Consequently, the regulated rates may not always be 
sufficient to recover the incurred costs.  In most cases, annual settlements are sufficient to reconcile any 
deviations of the incurred costs from the expected revenue requirements, with minor rate impacts in 
subsequent years.  However, the distortion is acute when the realized costs deviate significantly from the 
expected costs in a given year, and the deviations cannot be settled in the following annual review period 
due to significant rate impacts.  The energy cost component of the regulated ToLR is prone to such 
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deviations because the rate does not reflect the volatility in the costs of energy procured in the wholesale 
electricity market.  The ToLR rates thus lock-in an expected price of energy.  In the competitive retail 
sector, energy prices are passed through to customers in each billing cycle, through which retailers can 
recover their energy costs.  The distortion is therefore limited to the regulated tariff segment of the 
industry, affecting the regulated entities operating in that segment.  In the Spanish system, such a 
distortion has been observed in the form of annual tariff deficits between 2000 and 2009, because the 
realized energy costs have been much higher than expected costs.  Table 12 lists the tariff deficit as 
recognized by law for the period 2000-2008, amounting to approximately € 14.5 billion, of which little over 
€ 2 billion have been recovered.  The estimated deficit as of 2009, which includes the estimated 
incremental deficit of the year 2009, amounts to approximately € 15 billion.  By law, the unrecovered 
portions of the deficits realized in each time period have been annuitized for recovery over the next 12 – 
13 years. 
Table 12.  Estimated Tariff Deficit (2000 – 2009) 
Data Source: CNE (2009) 
Category Deficit Value as Recognized by Law
Recovery Pending 
as of Dec 2008
Prescribed Recovery 
Annuity Value as of 2008
Estimated Recovery 
Pending as of Dec 2009
Pending 
Annuities
(years)
Mainland Supply 
(2000 - 2002)                        1,522.33                       417.71                                   220.90                                 214.52                  1 
Extrapeninsular 
Islands' Supply 
(2001 - 2002)
                          387.81                       264.33                                   140.27                                 135.26                  1 
Extrapeninsular 
Islands' Supply 
(2003 - 2005)
                          533.41                       471.99                                     48.72                                 443.27                12 
Mainland Supply 
(2005)                        3,830.45                    3,498.72                                   379.05                              3,270.01                11 
Mainland Supply 
(2006)                        2,279.94                    2,082.72                                   211.45                              1,960.77                12 
Mainland Supply 
(2007)                        1,244.44                    1,214.28                                   119.54                              1,154.81                13 
Mainland Supply 
(2008)                        4,745.02                    4,494.71                                   348.49                              4,339.36                13 
Sub-total                      14,543.39                  12,444.46                                1,468.41                            11,518.00 
Mainland Supply 
(2009) (estimated)                                   -                                -                                            -                                3,484.63  N/A 
Total                  14,543.39              12,444.46                          1,468.41                       15,002.63 
(million Euros nominal)
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The cause of the deficit is mainly attributed to the differences in the expected and realized costs of 
electrical energy in the wholesale electricity market, and the exceptionally large payments made to 
generators under the Special Regime.  Data on the value of payments to SR generators was not found.  
Figure 5 compares the distribution companies’ average prices and their realized energy costs (€/MWh) for 
the period 1998-2009 (upper graph), and the corresponding deficit (€ billions) (lower graph).  The lower 
graph indicates two types of deficits - “ex post,” realized in 2000-2002, 2005 and 2006, and “ex ante,” 
realized in 2007-2008.  In the ex post deficit, the revenues collected based on the pre-set regulated tariff 
charges were found to substantially under recover the costs, after the annual billing and settlement cycle.  
In other words, the ex post deficits were not expected to occur, because the shocks were realized during 
the cycle.  On the contrary, the ex ante deficit recognizes that revenues collected during the subsequent 
annual cycle will be insufficient to cover costs incurred during cycle.  That is, the costs incurred are 
expected to exceed the revenues collected.   
 
Figure 5.  Distributors’ Revenue and Cost Deviations and Resulting Deficits (2000 – 2009) 
Source: CNE (2009) 
Figure 6 is a schematic of the process for creating an ex ante deficit.  The “additive scenario” on the left 
describes the ideal situation where the total costs of electricity comprised of energy and access costs are 
fully recovered through revenues based on the pre-set regulated rates.  The “real scenario” on the right 
describes a situation where the total income is artificially lower than the incurred costs to maintain low 
electricity rates.  The deficit introduced (shown in blue) is called the ex ante deficit.  Rate shock is 
minimized by allowing only a small portion of the deficit (either current or accumulated) such as an 
annuitized amount to be collected in addition to the artificially lowered costs. 
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Figure 7 shows a graph of how the ex ante deficit was created for the years 2007-2009.  The increasing 
average access costs (red line) were expected to be higher than the regulated rates (blue line) (upper 
graph, in c€/kWh).  Between 2008 and 2009, a small rate adder or surcharge was included in the 
regulated rates to recover the annuitized portion of the deficit in previous years.  The lower graph depicts 
the relative levels of accumulating ex post deficits and newly incurred ex ante deficits. 
 
Figure 6.  Schematic for the Creation of an Ex Ante Deficit 
Source: CNE (2009) 
Ex ante deficits were justified in the Spanish system on the grounds that electricity customers would not 
be able to bear the substantial rate increases required to recover the deficits of past years and significant 
future electricity cost increases.  Distributors’ financial obligations to generators were ordered to be 
fulfilled by law to protect the wholesale electricity market.  The deficit was allocated to the access tariffs 
and ordered to be annuitized and recovered as by distribution companies as receipts on long-term debt.  
Consequently, the unrecovered deficit amounts are a financial obligation on the part of the Spanish 
government to the regulated distribution companies.  Although these companies are assured of eventual 
deficit recovery in the long-term, the lack of recovery in the short term may have perverse effects on their 
operations. 
The effects of the economic distortion introduced by the regulated ToLR due to high energy costs are 
evidenced in part by the trend of customers switching from retail arrangements to regulated tariffs, and 
back to retail supply when energy costs drop.  When the retail energy prices rose as a consequence of 
high energy costs, especially in the middle of a regulatory review period, ToLR rates stayed constant and 
did not exhibit the magnitude of increase or volatility of the wholesale market.  The annual increase in 
ToLR rate was artificially depressed to keep prices low for most end-use customers.  Consequently, many 
customers in Spain who had switched from regulated tariffs to competitive retail contracts during the 
course of restructuring began to switch back to ToLR between 2003 and 2008.  Figure 8 depicts this trend 
graphically.  Between 2003 and 2008, the total number of customers in the retail market increased, along 
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with the corresponding increase in the total consumption of electricity in the retail segment.  However, 
some customers appear to have switched back to ToLR tariffs between 2006 and 2008.  Further, total 
retail consumption in 2008 appears to have returned to the pre-2006 level before switching was observed.  
Although customers could have switched from regulated tariffs to retail supply for reasons other than 
energy prices, such as the increasing availability of retail contracts due to a growing number of suppliers 
or more favorable contract terms, it is plausible that the switching back to regulated tariffs was primarily 
due to the assurance of lower rates through ToLR tariffs.  The effects and trends are likely to be different 
for commercial and industrial customers, compared to small residential customers. 
 
Figure 7.  Regulated Tariff Rates and Corresponding Deficit Levels (2007 -2009) 
Source: CNE (2009) 
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Figure 8.  Regulated Tariff Rates and Corresponding Deficit Levels (2007 -2009) 
Data Source: CNE (2009) 
As described earlier, a major share of the deficit can be attributed to large payments made to SR 
generators.  Of the SR generators, distributed generators are also indirectly provided network subsidies in 
addition to special energy rates through the SR mechanism because they do not pay Use of System 
charges to the network company while supplying electricity to the grid.  These generators receive special 
rates for the net metered electricity supplied, as described in Table 2.  When such generators consume 
more electricity than they generate, they are charged according to the appropriate customer category for 
the net electricity consumed.  On the other hand, they receive payments when they supply surplus 
electricity back to the distribution network. In many cases, the special tariff rate used is higher than the 
final ToLR rate or retail tariff rate.  Furthermore, payments to distributed generation under the SR are 
recovered from all customers through the access tariff.  In effect, distributed generators are subsidized 
because they are paid for using the network when they supply to the grid, and these costs are borne by 
end-use customers. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
From the initial discussion of the economics and principles of electricity network tariff design and the 
subsequent country studies, we gather that the process of designing tariffs is replete with choices and 
trade-offs.  The variety of choices and some of their consequences are observed in the individual country 
studies.  Tariff designs are influenced by the underlying physical characteristics of the electricity network 
such as the geographical footprint, the number and relative concentration of users, characteristics and 
location of generation, etc.  The economic properties of networks – economies of scale and scope and 
public good aspects – must be reconciled with their physical properties to ensure their sustainability.  The 
task of reconciliation is not always easy to accomplish and this is where the trade-offs and choices 
become important.  In response to the recurring question of “what is the ideal tariff design?” we therefore 
conclude that there is no ideal tariff design that can be derived based purely on the technological or 
economic features of a network.  Rather, the tariff design is driven by a delicate balance between the 
network features and the policy goals of the particular system.  To put it more directly, there is an ideal 
tariff design that can be devised for any policy objective, given the unique features of any network.  The 
appropriate question on the subject of network tariff designs should therefore be “what is the ideal tariff 
design for policy objective X or Y?”     
The primary policy goal of the tariff design is to recover the total costs incurred in providing network 
services to all network users.  This goal dictates that the total incurred costs must first be estimated or 
measured before they can be collected.  That is, the first step of implementing a tariff design is 
determining the annual revenue requirements for a network.  Observations about the relative ARRs for 
networks in different countries indicate that the amounts include not only network-related capital and 
operating expenses, but also more general costs incurred due to a variety of energy policies. The costs of 
energy policy may sometimes overshadow network-related costs in the ARR.  As a result the ARR is no 
longer a useful indicator of the aggregate economic value of the network.  Some may dismiss this 
concern by using the label “access tariff” instead of network tariff.  If this is done, network companies 
effectively become the billing and collection agent for energy policy payments on behalf of the 
government.  Yet, the purported benefits of such energy policy are gained by the entire economy or 
population and not just electricity network users.  Moreover, including large energy policy costs in an 
access tariff subjects its allocation to various network users by using the rules that have been designed 
for the cost allocation of network costs.  These rules may not be suitable, let alone optimal, for the 
allocation of general energy policy costs.  The severity of this issue becomes apparent when network 
companies are prohibited from recovering legitimate or reasonable network related costs incurred in the 
normal course of business.  Disallowing or deferring the recovery of such costs sets a precedent that 
regulators may choose to modify the rules of the game at any point.  Such regulatory uncertainty may 
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seriously harm the economic sustainability of an electricity system.  Including large non-network related 
costs in a network or access tariff and the uncertain regulatory treatment of such costs therefore severely 
distorts network companies’ and users’ subsequent incentives for building, maintaining and using the 
network.  Electricity systems should therefore consider other economy-wide approaches for assigning 
costs and benefits of non-network related energy policy.   
Once the annual revenue requirement has been identified, the task of allocating costs to various network 
users must be performed.  In addition to ensuring full recovery of the ARR, the tariff can be designed to 
achieve a number of secondary policy objectives.  These policy objectives significantly influence the 
outcomes regarding the availability and use of the network, and the outcomes may be different for 
different network users.  For instance, if generators pay shallow connection charges, they have no 
incentive to select a generation technology that minimizes the cost of network reinforcements.  However, 
they may still have an incentive to locate closer to the network to minimize their connection charge.  
Similarly, a large industrial customer’s choice of location and connection capacity could also be affected if 
electricity is a large cost factor in its production process and it is responsible for large connection and 
capacity charges.  Additionally, if generators are not responsible for network Use of System charges, they 
may not have an incentive to locate close to the load they wish to serve and may instead select a location 
that minimizes their costs of generation.  This decision may impose network development costs that have 
to be recovered only from end-use customers, even though generators benefit from using the shared 
network.  Recognizing that the network charges to the generators will ultimately be passed through to 
end-use customers in any case may create the impression that such charges are meaningless.  However, 
if the generator is required to include these charges in its production decisions, its competitiveness in the 
wholesale market for generation may be affected.  In the context of this discussion, the issue that merits 
examination in every electricity system is not whether generators or certain types of end-use customers 
should be made to pay Use of System charges, but whether requiring them to do so can achieve the 
policy objective that the system designers have in mind based on the incentive structures that are 
created.  Holding some network users responsible for certain types of charges affects the incentive 
structures that they see, even though all costs are ultimately passed through to end-use customers.  The 
network tariff design is therefore not intrinsically good or bad, or ideal or non-ideal, but a judgment about 
the quality of a design should be based on its effectiveness in achieving the desired outcome. 
Another area of trade-offs in tariff design arises out of the fact policy objectives can sometimes conflict.  
Tariffs that are designed to achieve one outcome may often be ill-suited to achieve others.  For instance, 
if the objective is to maintain simplicity so that network users can understand the tariffs, then it is likely 
that the ideal design for this purpose is some type of average cost allocation which results in average 
rates such a postage-stamp rates.  On the other hand, if the objective is to have tariffs that are efficient in 
terms of allocation, then a complex reference network model could be used to developed detailed and 
specific tariff rates.  However, such a model would not be very comprehensible to most, thereby 
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decreasing its usefulness in many cases.  Thus, the trade-off here is between simplicity and efficiency, 
and one may be valued more than the other in a particular system.  Similar trade-offs can be identified 
with regard to the other tariff design principles or policy objectives. 
Tariff designs can often create cross-subsidies between various types of network users.  In such cases, a 
subset of users typically imposes higher network-related costs on the system than other users, but the 
charges for all users are identical.  In effect, the latter group of users subsidizes the former.  One example 
of this is the provision of network services to customers who live in rural areas, or far away from load 
centers.  Many systems have chosen to charges such customers rates identical to those faced by 
customers in urban areas or close to load centers, to serve the objective of equality in rates.  In this 
situation, the urban customers are subsidizing the provision of network services to rural customers.  
Although this policy choice is often questioned by advocates of economically efficient tariffs, it can be 
justified on the grounds that networks are shared and it is difficult to separate network assets that are 
used for purely from urban delivery from those used for rural delivery.  Providing lower rates to low-
income or disadvantaged consumer groups is a more explicit form of subsidy.  The costs imposed by 
such customers on the system are borne by all other customer categories, and could be questioned on 
the grounds of efficiency.  However, such a tariff design accomplishes the objective of universal access to 
all customers within the footprint of a system.  Tariff designs that include cross-subsidies to further one or 
more policy objectives can be better justified if the process for calculating the subsidies and the impact on 
various network users is transparently presented while making a case for the design. 
Perverse incentives can be evidenced when some types of network users are paid for using the network, 
instead of being charged for network use.  For instance, distributed generators use the network when 
they draw electricity from the grid and are appropriately charged for network use during those times.  
When they produce more electricity than they consume and supply back to they grid, they are still using 
the network.  Not charging them for network use when they supply electricity to the network is indirectly 
providing such generators a subsidy.  Further, if they are paid a high retail rate inclusive of network-
related components or an additional premium for the electricity supplied, they are effectively being paid to 
use the network.  Thus, distributed generators do not have to factor in the costs of network use as 
compared to the value of electricity supplied while deciding whether to invest in such generators.  
Moreover, their portion of network costs will be likely be borne by other customers in their customer 
segment.  If the policy objective is to provide distributed generators with an incentive, such users could 
receive a high energy price through a mechanism such as gross metering and still be held responsible for 
network charges.   
 There are some issues with respect to which the network tariff design may not be the optimal method for 
providing users with incentives.  Addressing transmission-related congestion or losses through 
differentiation in the transmission Use of System charges by geographical location is one such issue.  
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Locational Marginal Pricing is a suitable approach for providing network users with locational signals that 
include the value of congestion or losses which can be used by generators for site selection, in addition to 
other incentives that they see based on connection or Use of System charges.   
In conclusion, we find that there are a variety of choices and trade-offs that must be made while designing 
the electricity network tariffs for any electricity system.  The tariff design must not only be influenced by 
the technical and economic characteristics of the system, but also the secondary policy objectives that 
policy makers wish to achieve, while allowing network companies to recover the costs of building and 
maintaining the network. 
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